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Abstract
D. Eckstein, T. Koenig, M.Wyss, &W. J. Perrig (Bern, Switzerland)—Monitoring the Time Course
of Perception without Awareness: A Comparison of Mirror Masked Words and Nonwords
Mirror masked words are embedded into a context that makes them appear as senseless patterns or as
strings of unfamiliar letters. Thus, mirror masked words can be shown for several hundreds of milliseconds
without being recognised as words. We sought to further investigate effects of nonsconscious reading by
monitoring event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants observed mirror masked letter strings.
ERPs were recorded while participants observed mirror masked words and nonwords. Data of 15 partici-
pants was segmented into periods of quasi-stable field topography (microstates). Microstates for masked
words and nonwords were compared using randomization tests, statistical parametric scalp maps and Low
Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA).
ERPs to masked words and nonwords showed significant topographic differences between 136 and 256
ms, indicating that stimuli were nonconsciously discriminated. A LORETA model localised sources of
activation discriminating between masked words and nonwords in left operculum, the right superior pari-
etal lobe and right superior temporal gyrus indicating higher current density for nonwords than for words
in these areas.
ERPs of mirror masked stimuli can indicate unconscious discrimination even in cases where behavioural
priming is unreliable. This approach might be useful for investigating differences in early, nonconscious
stages of word perception.
Keywords: Reading; Language; Subliminal perception; ERPs; LORETA
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In the past few years, research on perception
without awareness has obtained consider-
able attention in cognitive science. Effective
masking techniques have been developed
with which stimuli can be presented sublimi-
nally. Priming experiments with subliminally
presented words and letter strings have been
successfully used to investigate processing
of linguistic properties of words (cf. Frost,
Forster, & Deutsch, 1997; Grainger, Colé,
& Segui, 1991; Kinoshita & Lupker, 2003),
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effects of attitudes and emotional content
(cf. Bargh, 1992; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh,
2006; Wentura, 2002) and effects on memory
(e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). The usual
method of masking is to embed to-be-masked
stimuli in a rapid visual stream of pattern
masks. This combination of short stimulus
duration and overlapping visual percepts of
stimulus and masks leads to the visual expe-
rience that the stimulus is invisible. However,
this method only works within a narrow range
of possible presentation times that exclude
awareness of stimuli. It has also been noted
that the onset of a mask that follows a stimulus
has the effect of interrupting any bottom-up
processing of the stimulus up to that point
(Humphreys, Besner, & Quinlan, 1988; Ko-
vacs, Vogels, & Orban, 1995; Rolls & Tovee,
1994). Because of its tight limits, the timing
must ideally be empirically determined on an
individual basis for every participant in a given
experiment.
Another difficulty arises from the fact that
subliminal perception must be indirectly in-
ferred from participants’ reactions. Earlier at-
tempts to use direct measures (whereby par-
ticipants were asked to indicate which word in
a list appeared beforehand) have suffered from
unreliability, which explains why indirect mea-
surements based on priming are commonly
used. The actual paradigmatic measurement
of subliminal perception consists in assessing
priming by subliminal primes on reactions to
succeeding visible probes. These priming ef-
fects are not as large, and thus more difficult
to replicate than priming effects obtained with
visible primes. One way to increase the ef-
fect size is to familiarise participants with the
test material used in the task. Indeed, ef-
fects can be quite robust when using this strat-
egy (cf. Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996;
Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995), which ex-
plains why existing fMRI studies on subliminal
perception have been based on this approach
(e.g., Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, & Rivière,
2001; Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec'H, & Le
Bihan, 1998; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001).
However, it has become evident that frequently
repeating the same set of stimuli with fixed re-
sponse mappings leads to automatisation of all
processes involved in responding. As a conse-
quence, processes of perception, memory and
response preparation become difficult to sep-
arate (Damian, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoff-
mann, 2003). This issue is further complicated
by the fact that the threshold of consciousness
decreases with repeated presentation (Wol-
ford, Marchak, & Hughes, 1988), which can
lead to paradoxical priming effects, e.g. ef-
fects that appear to be related to the mean-
ing of stimuli but are instead driven by low-level
perceptual properties of the stimuli (Abrams &
Greenwald, 2000; Greenwald, Abrams, Nac-
cache, & Dehaene, 2003; Kouider & Dupoux,
2004).
To overcome these methodological difficul-
ties of delicate timing issues or small effect
sizes, we developed a masking method that
does not rely on temporal masking, but in-
stead uses spatial masking (Perrig & Eckstein,
2005). This masking technique, which we call
mirror maskingüses each letter’s mirror image
to mask the word. As can be seen in Figure 1,
letters are merged with their inverted counter-
part at the letters' base line. In previous exper-
iments of ours, mirror masking has proven ef-
fective in hiding prime words (that were shown
for 750 ms) from awareness: Across a range
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of unpublished and published experiments with
over 200 participants, 85% of participants re-
ported not having perceived any of the prime
words after the experiment (Perrig & Eckstein,
2005). The masking effect is in principle due
to a visual neglect driven by attentional diver-
sion, thus resembling the phenomenon of 'inat-
tentional blindness' (Mack & Rock, 1998). The
fact that the mirror masked letters form new
symmetrical patterns resembling an unknown
alphabet further enhances the masking effect.
Indeed, when participants start seeing words
in the patterns, they are usually unable to de-
scribe the masking at first, because the words
tend to be seen as ’popping out’ of the pat-
tern. Due to its different mode of functioning,
mirror masking has two outstanding advan-
tages compared to pattern masking: (a) Re-
ports of conscious perception do not depend
on response criterion levels, because words
are seen as popping out as a whole, and (b)
presentation time is in principle not critical.
We have previously observed replicable
priming of mirror masked primes with the word
stem completion task and, less reliably, with
the lexical decision task. In word stem comple-
tion, where participants are asked to complete
a 3-letter word onset with two or three letters
such that a valid word is formed, masked prime
words that were only shown once in an exper-
iment were reliably completed more often than
control words, and this effect remained stable
over stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 1
to 3 seconds (Perrig & Eckstein, 2005). Sub-
sequent studies suggested that priming is not
due to single letters or word-parts, because
completion of words was not facilitated by sub-
strings of primes (Eckstein, Sturzenegger, &
Perrig, in preparation). However, it is possible
that perception of words does not reach the
semantic level, as semantic priming was found
to depend on participants’ reading ability (cf.
Eckstein, Norris, Davis, & Henson, 2009).
Our previous studies thus indicate that mirror
masked words are unconsciously processed
at a nonsemantic lexical level. Therefore, they
can be used as a tool to investigate the mech-
anisms of nonconscious perceptual and lexical
word perception that is not accompanied by
awareness.
In all experiments so far, behavioural prim-
ing by masked words was weak. This is a
usual finding in this field, when one uses
non-repeated word presentation (cf. Damian,
2001). The present study was conducted be-
cause ERP measures have been found to be
more sensitive to nonconscious priming than
behavioural priming (e.g., Holcomb, Reder,
Misra, & Grainger, 2005; Kiefer, 2002; Misra &
Holcomb, 2003). The main idea was to locate
temporal and topographic differences in ERPs
recorded while participants observed masked
words and nonwords. This approach is usually
difficult to do because ERPs of the masked
stimulus interfere with ERPs of the succeeding
nonmasked stimulus in priming studies. In-
stead, we were able to present mirror masked
words for 500 ms, which allowed us for on-line
monitoring of processes occurring while partic-
ipants fixed the masked letter strings. Because
we could not assume to find the same ERP
components for nonconscious perception as
the ones reported for conscious word percep-
tion (cf. Compton, Grossenbacher, Posner,
& Tucker, 1991; Grossi & Coch, 2005; Hino-
josa, Martin-Loeches, & Rubia, 2001; Nobre &
McCarthy, 1995; Schendan, Ganis, & Kutas,
1998; Sereno, Rayner, & Posner, 1998, for
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Figure 1: Example of the mirror masked term ’mirror nonwords’. Construction of mirrored letters is
illustrated in the upper part of the figure. In the lower part, examples of mirrored nonwords (left, from
top: ”skofe”, ”neibs”, ”weethce”, ”ruiohs”, ”ararlon”, ”druimed” and ”orulkce”) and words (right, from
top: ”berth”, ”autumn”, ”liver”, ”success”, ”heaven”, ”irritation” and ”chance”) are reproduced. Note:
The original language used was German.
prelexical processing; Cohen et al., 2000;
Martin-Loeches, Hinojosa, Gomez-Jarabo,
& Rubia, 1999; Nobre, Allison, & McCarthy,
1994; Rudell & Hua, 1997; Skrandies, 1998
for discrimination of word-forms or retrieval
from word lexicon; Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla,
2000; Dietrich et al., 2001; Holcomb, et al.
2005; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; McCarthy, No-
bre, Bentin, & Spencer, 1995; Wirth et al.,
2006 for semantics, but see Penolazzi, Hauk,
& Pulvermüller, 2007), we used the microstate
and the TANOVA methods, which are both
apt for explorative determination of significant
differences in ERP topographies between time
segments and conditions (McCarthy et al.,
1995). Therefore, comparison with findings
stemming from research with visible words,
according which differences at about 200 ms
would be expected with lexical differences be-
tween stimuli, can only be done with extreme
caution.
Analysis was based on comparisons of ERP
scalp topographies across conditions in differ-
ent time segments, using the microstate ap-
proach. The time course of ERP topographies
contains periods of relative stability during
which change across time is minimal. These
periods of quasi stable ERP topography have
been called ’microstates’ and are thought
to correspond to basic steps of information
processing (Lehmann, 1990). Because it is
sensible to collapse across similar data from
a statistical point of view, on- and offset times
of microstates were used to define time win-
dows of analysis. Using a bootstrap method,
comparison of microstate topographies across
conditions was then used to locate differences
in active cerebral generators.
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The experiment consisted in priming task
using lexical decision, whereby each visible
probe (word or nonword) letter string was pre-
ceded by a mirror masked (word or nonword)
letter string shown for 500 ms. This was done
to ensure that participants were looking at the
masked stimuli when they appeared on the
screen, although their attention was directed
towards the succeeding probes. On the basis
of a previous unpublished experiment, we ten-
tatively expected priming effects for word-word
compared to nonword-word trials which would
indicate lexical processing of the primes. In
order to rule out other reasons for such prim-
ing, orthographic and semantic relatedness of
masked and visible stimuli was minimised and




Participants were 8 male and 11 female vol-
unteers aged 21 to 38 years (M = 28.5, SD
= 5.7). They were all native German speak-
ers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
without any neurological or neuropsychologi-
cal disorder and without psychoactive medica-
tion. 16 participants were self-reported right-
handers and 3 were ambidextrous. All partic-
ipants were naïve to the experimental hypoth-
esis, had never been in contact with the mirror
word masking paradigm and were naïve with
respect to priming paradigms. The study was
approved by the University’s ethics committee
and informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Stimuli
180 non-associated word pairs were selected
from a set of German nouns, most of which
described concrete and emotionally neutral
concepts. Word length varied between 3 and
8 letters and between 1 and 3 syllables. Or-
thographic similarity of words in word pairs
was very low as measured by an index of
orthographic similarity described in Weber,
1970. This set of word pairs was divided
into four groups of 45 word pairs that were
balanced with respect to word length, number
of syllables, orthographic similarity and word
frequency (Institut für Deutsche Sprache,
1991-2007), based on occurrences in Swiss
Newspaper texts. Nonwords were constructed
by concatenating letters that were randomly
selected from each letter position of the ex-
perimental word set. 180 nonwords were
constructed on the basis of the first word in
the word pairs, and another 180 nonwords
were constructed in the same way based on
the second word in the word pairs. Hence,
letter frequencies of words and nonwords
were identical at each letter position. Pairings
of masked and nonmasked stimuli were con-
trolled. The four groups of word pairs were
counterbalanced over participants and the
four possible pairing conditions (masked word
vs. nonmasked probe word, masked nonword
vs. nonmasked probe word; masked word vs.
nonmasked probe nonword, masked nonword
vs. nonmasked probe nonword). Additional 15
nonwords and 5 words were used for practice.
Procedure
Participants were comfortably seated in
a darkened, acoustically and electrically
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shielded recording chamber. A 15”’ liquid
display VGA screen and an IBM compatible
personal computer was used for stimulus dis-
play. Participants were seated at a distance
of about 50 cm from the screen, their heads
positioned by a head-rest mounted on a small
table in front of them. Left and right keys of
a button box were used with the index fin-
gers of the left and right hand for collection
of responses. The experimental program was
written in MEL 2.0 (Schneider, 1988).
10 practice trials and 180 experimental trials
were shown. Each trial had a fixed sequence
starting with a 1s blank screen which was fol-
lowed by a 500 ms mirror masked stimulus,
then a 500 ms blank screen, and finally a 500
ms nonmasked probe stimulus. The response
window started at probe onset and lasted for
one second. Inter-trial interval duration was
one second. Participants were instructed to
fixate the centre of the screen, where an ab-
stract pattern (the masked letter string) would
indicate the imminent onset of the letter string
probe. They were asked to press as quickly as
possible the key corresponding to the type of
probe shown. Right and left button box keys
were alternatively assigned to word and non-
word probes across participants. Participants
were also instructed to keep eye movements
and eye blinks to a minimum during trials.
All stimuli were presented at the centre of
the screen in white lettering on a black back-
ground. The mirrored letter strings were pre-
sented in mirror masked lower-case letters
written in 'boxie17' font, subtending a vertical
visual angle of about 1°and a horizontal vi-
sual angle of about 4°. Probe letter strings
were presented in upper-case in 'FG-16' (MEL
font) which had the same height as the mir-
rored font. Sequence of the 180 trials was
randomized. Each participant saw 45 stimu-
lus pairs in each of the four conditions of word-
nonword combinations, whereby word groups
were rotated between conditions and partici-
pants, and nonwords were randomly chosen
from the nonword set. Each word and non-
word in the stimulus set was shown maximally
once during the experiment. A short break was
given after 60 and 120 trials.
At the end of the experiment, participant’s
awareness of the masked words was as-
sessed with three consecutive questions: Had
they noticed anything unusual in the patterns?
Had they seen single letters in them? And, had
they seen words in them? These questions
were used to determine which of the partici-
pants were not aware of the words throughout
the whole experiment.
Electrophysiological Recording
EEGs were recorded by 74 Ag/AgCl scalp
electrodes mounted on an elastic cap accord-
ing to the international 10-10 system. To
record eye blinks, two additional electrodes
were placed below the eyes. Cz was used
as recording reference. Electrode impedances
were held below 10 kOhm. Signals were am-
plified, bandpass filtered at 0.5-70 Hz, digi-
tized at 250 Hz and continuously stored for of-
fline analysis. Stimulus onsets were recorded
with a separate channel appearing in the EEG
recordings.
EEG preprocessing and averaging
From the raw EEG data, electrooculograph-
ical signals (EOG) were computed as bipo-
lar derivations between F9 and F10 (horizon-
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tal EOG) and the channels below the eye
against Fp1 and Fp2 (vertical EOG). All 74
scalp channels were recomputed to average
reference. After applying a 50 Hz notch filter
and a 1.5 to 30 Hz bandpass filter, the analy-
sis epochs were selected, starting at the onset
of each stimulus and lasting for 500 ms. (After
500 ms, eye movements were more frequent).
These epochs were DC corrected (baseline re-
moval) and submitted to a semi-automatic ar-
tifact detection that rejected epochs with chan-
nels showing peak to peak amplitudes larger
than 100 uV within 100 ms and artifacts iden-
tified by visual inspection. Over participants,
the rate of rejection due to artifacts was about
10%. For each subject, separate mean ERPs
were computed for masked nonwords, masked
words, nonmasked nonwords and nonmasked
words. For each of these four conditions, a
grand-mean across all participants was com-
puted.
Identification of microstates
Identification of microstates was based on
Global Field Power (GFP) of the grand-mean
ERPs for masked and nonmasked stimuli,
respectively (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980).
Separate microstate analyses were done
based on the post-hoc observation that the
GFP time course and the topographies of
the grand-mean ERPs were substantially dif-
ferent. GFP is a momentary, global index of
topographic strength and is defined as the spa-
tial standard deviation. Periods of high GFP
assumingly correspond to near-synchronous
activity of neural populations, and changes
of ERP topography typically occur in local
troughs of the GFP (Lehmann, 1986). We
therefore used the troughs of the GFP curve to
determine on- and offsets of the microstates
used for further analysis. Microstates that had
an on- or offset at the beginning or ending of
the 0 to 500 ms post-stimulus analysis period
were not further analysed. For illustration pur-
poses, stability of microstates between GFP
troughs was further quantified by computing
the matrix of spatial correlations across time
(Kochi, Koenig, Strik, & Lehmann, 1996).
Comparison of the ERPs
Statistical comparisons of word and nonword
ERPs across subjects were done separately
for masked and nonmasked stimuli. Separate
analyses were conducted for comparison of
microstate amplitude and topography in each
microstate time window. For each subject and
condition, individual mean microstate topogra-
phies were first computed. Differences be-
tween microstate amplitudes associated with
words and nonwords were tested with paired
two-tailed t-tests over subjects on GFP (statis-
tical parametric scalp maps).
For the comparison of microstate topog-
raphy between word and nonword condi-
tions, a randomization statistic was applied
using the 'TANOVA' program (available on-
line at www.unizh.ch/keyinst/ NewLORETA/
LORETA01.htm). Using Global Map Dissimi-
larity (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980) as a GFP-
independent difference measure between con-
ditions, TANOVA applies a randomization test
(Edgington, 1980; Manly, 1997) to establish
the exact probability of the observed difference
by assuming a null hypothesis of zero topo-
graphic dissimilarity. This procedure has been
used in earlier studies (Kondakor, Pascual-
Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1995; Lehmann
et al., 2005; Strik, Fallgatter, Brandeis, &
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Pascual-Marqui, 1998). In microstates where
TANOVA indicated a topographic difference
at p <.05, further analyses were performed:
Firstly, t-maps were computed, thresholded
at p < .05 (uncorrected) and displayed for
comparison with other studies (note that these
t-values were not used for further statistical
interference, since the null-hypothesis was
rejected by the TANOVA). Secondly, since
evidence for a topographic difference implies
that there must have been differences in
the underlying sources, a distributed source
localization procedure was employed to lo-
cate these putative intracerebral sources of
significant differences.
Source localization was based on low reso-
lution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA,
Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999; Pascual-Marqui,
Michel, & Lehmann, 1994) applied to indi-
vidual, normalized (maximum GFP = 1) mi-
crostate topographies of both included stim-
ulus conditions. This version computed the
electric current density in the cortical areas of
the digitized brain atlas of the Montreal Neu-
rological Institute (MNI) at ˜7 mm resolution
(2394 voxels). In those microstates where
the TANOVA indicated significant differences
of ERP topography between conditions, voxel-
by-voxel t-statistics were used to identify those
voxels that could putatively account for the dif-
ferences observed on the scalp. For illustra-
tion purposes, the highest threshold of the t-
statistics was set at an alpha level of 5%.
Results
Behavioral Data
Four participants saw at least one word in the
masked letter strings and were therefore ex-
cluded from all subsequent analyses. All other
participants reported that they did not notice
anything unusual in the patterns and that they
had seen no letters or words in them. When
asked about the mirror masked strings, some
of these participants guessed that they were
strings of an unknown writing, as for instance
hieroglyphics. All analyses were performed
on the data of these remaining 15 participants
who were ignorant of the information hidden in
the mask. Response accuracy was reasonably
high, with 95% correct responses for words
(SD = 3%) and 92% correct responses for non-
words (SD = 5%). Average reaction times were
faster for words, M = 579 ms (SD = 55 ms),
than for nonwords, M = 639 ms (SD = 75 ms),
t(14) = 7.09, p < .001. No effect of priming was
found when comparing masked-string/visible
string pairs that where congruent vs. incon-
gruent in lexicality (e.g., word-word and non-
word/nonword vs. nonword-word pairs; effect
of type of masked string, F(1,14) = 0.62, p >
.20 and interaction of type of masked string
with type of visible string, F(1,14) = 1.95, p =
.18).
Masked Words and Nonwords
Segmentation of grand mean ERPs yielded
3 microstates. Microstate topographies, mi-
crostate latencies and GFP time course for
masked stimuli are shown in upper part of
Fig. 2. The stability of microstates was further
quantified with spatiotemporal correlation ma-
trices of ERPs averaged across subjects and
conditions (Fig. 3, left).
The first microstate was a P100 topography
with a bilateral occipital positivity (88-136 ms).
This was followed by a N200 that displayed
an occipital bilateral negativity and a fronto-
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Figure 2: Topographies and latencies of the microstates identified in the grand mean ERPs for masked
(upper graph) and nonmasked stimuli (lower graph). Each graph shows the mean microstate topographies,
head seen from above; red indicates positive, blue negative values, referred to average reference. The
topographies were scaled to maximal Global Field Power (GFP) = 1. The curve in each graph shows
the GFP (vertical) of the ERPs as function of time (horizontal). Microstate borders were set at the local
minima of the GFP curve (indicated by the vertical lines).
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Figure 3: Illustration of stability of topographic maps over time. Both axes indicate time with respect
to stimulus onset. Spatial correlations of ERP signals across time are shown for masked (left) and non-
masked (right) stimuli. Red areas correspond to positive correlations, and blue areas indicate negative
correlations. Color saturation indicates strength of correlation. During dark red time segments (indicat-
ing inter-correlations higher than .9), topographies were stable.
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central positivity (136-256 ms). A third mi-
crostate was characterized by a bilateral pari-
etal positivity and a fronto-central negativity
(256-404 ms).
Comparison of GFP differences between
word and nonword stimulus microstates indi-
cated no significant GFP differences between
words and nonwords. The randomization test
of topographic dissimilarity however indicated
significant differences of microstate topogra-
phies in the 136-256 ms microstate (p = .034,
cf. Fig. 4).
Results of the voxelwise comparisons of
LORETA solutions in microstates with word-
nonword topographic differences are shown in
Fig. 5 and Table 1 (see also the supplementary
material). According to the LORETA model,
differences between masked words and non-
words between 136 and 256 ms were related
to higher current density for nonwords than for
words in left operculum, right superior parietal
lobe and right superior temporal lobe (first row
in Figure 5).
Nonmasked words and nonwords
Grand mean ERPs and segmentation is
shown in Figures 2 and 3. Five microstates
were identified: A first microstate was a P100
with a bilateral occipital positivity (32-140 ms),
which was followed by a N200 that displayed
a strong occipital bilateral negativity and a
fronto-central positivity (144-200 ms). Then,
two microstates followed that lasted from 200
to 252 ms and from 256 to 320 ms, during
which the posterior negativity expanded over
central and left parietal sites. A fifth microstate
from 324 to 404 ms was characterized by large
negativity extending over midline and frontal
electrodes.
Comparison of GFP differences between
word and nonword stimulus microstates indi-
cated no significant GFP differences between
words and nonwords. The randomization test
of topographic dissimilarity indicated signifi-
cant differences of microstate topographies in
the 32-140 ms microstate (p = .027), the 200-
252 ms microstate (p = .008) and the 324-
404 ms microstate (p = .005). T-maps of the
microstates with significant topographic differ-
ences are shown in Fig. 4.
According to the LORETA model, differ-
ences between words and nonwords in the
32-140 ms segment were localized in right lat-
eral fusiform gyrus, left mediotemporal gyrus
and right superior frontal gyrus. During the
200-252 ms segment, differences were found
in right temporal lobe, left temporal lobe, left
posterior cingulate, right frontal operculum
and left superior occipital lobe. Between 324
and 404 ms, differences were found in right
orbitofrontal area, right superior frontal lobe,
left middle temporal gyrus and right middle
fusiform gyrus (Table I).
Discussion
This study investigated ERP time course of
mirror masked words and nonwords that were
not recognised by participants. Sequences of
stable microstates were analysed, which are
thought to reflect successive stages of word
processing that correlate with successive acti-
vation of functional brain areas (Koenig, Kochi,
& Lehmann, 1998; Koenig & Lehmann, 1996;
Michel et al., 2001; Pegna, Khateb, Michel, &
Landis, 2004).
Based on findings of earlier studies, differ-
ences between words and nonwords should
appear in the 100-200 ms segment with vis-
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Figure 4: Upper row: Mean microstate maps, scaling as in Fig. 3. Lower row: Statistical parametric
scalp maps for those microstates that showed significant topographic differences in the randomization
tests. Blue areas indicate larger values in the nonword condition; red areas indicate larger values in the
word condition. Increasing steps of color intensity indicate p values below .10, .05 and .01, respectively.
Figure 5: Glass brain images of voxels showing differences between words and nonwords (p < .05), darker
voxels indicate higher t values.
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ible words. Indeed, ERP differences of vis-
ible words vs. nonwords were found in a
P100 microstate located on the left parieto-
occipital lobe which is known to reflect font,
letter and n-gram differences (Compton et al.,
1991; Nobre et al., 1994; Sereno et al., 1998),
and is associated with foci wandering from the
occipital lobe to posterolateral fusiform gyrus
(Binder & Price, 2000; Fujimaki et al., 1999;
Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003; Petersen, Fox,
Snyder, & Raichle, 1990; Pugh et al., 1996;
Tarkiainen, Helenius, Hansen, Cornelissen,
& Salmelin, 1999) and sometimes also com-
bined with frontal areas (Hauk, Davis, Ford,
Pulvermuller, & Marslen-Wilson, 2006). Just
after the 200 ms point which appears to be
a marker of lexical access, significant word-
nonword ERP differences were found in a seg-
ment ranging from 200 to 252 ms. The differ-
ence map resembled regressor maps associ-
ated with word frequency reported by Hauk et
al. (2006). Word frequency is closely related to
word familiarity, which might have been used to
discriminate words from nonwords in our study.
The late differences in the 324 to 404 ms seg-
ment were reasonably in agreement with find-
ings related to postlexical and semantic pro-
cessing of words that are associated with pos-
terior negativity for words vs. nonwords, which
is seen with frontal lobe, middle temporal gyrus
and medial fusiform activation.
The topographic ERP-differences with
masked strings were different. Significant
differences between stable ERP topographies
when participants observed masked words
compared to when they observed masked
nonwords were found in a time segment from
136 to 256 ms after stimulus onset. Assuming
the study participants validly were not aware
of the words in the masked patterns, these
ERP differences suggest that some word-
related properties of masked stimuli were
unconsciously processed. This segment of
132 to 256 ms after stimulus onset was used
for further analysis to identify the processes
differentiating between masked words and
nonwords. First, ERPs averaged over the
whole time segment of interest were anal-
ysed. Difference maps formed a characteristic
pattern of focused temporo-parietal positivity
on the left hemisphere (Fig. 4). This pattern
bore resemblance with left-lateralised pos-
itivity around the temporo-occipital junction
related to orthography which is discussed to
be associated with N170 (Bentin, Mouchetant-
Rostaing, Giard, Echallier, & Pernier, 1999;
Salmelin, Service, Kiesila, Uutela, & Salonen,
1996, although this was reversed for nonwords
vs. words in our case), and parietal positivity
related to word frequency and lexicality (P3,
Proverbio, Vecchi, & Zani, 2004). Hence,
there were some similarities of masked stim-
ulus word-nonword differences and ERPs of
visible stimuli as reported in the literature.
In a second step, LORETA distributed
source solution for this left lateralized positivity
for masked words vs. nonwords was com-
puted (cf. Fig. 5). Results suggested that the
difference in topographies was due to stronger
current density for nonwords than for words in
two right hemisphere areas (superior temporal
lobe, superior parietal lobe) and in one left
hemisphere area (posterior operculum near
the Sylvian fissure). Activation in middle and
superior temporal lobe has frequently been
found with word vs. nonword comparisons,
although the activity tends to be left lateralised
or bilateral (Cohen et al., 2000; Nobre et al.,
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1994; Salmelin et al., 1996; Schendan et al.,
1998). Why the modelled temporal sources
are localized in the right hemisphere is difficult
to explain on the basis of the present results.
It is not unusual to assume that language
processing is bilateral but that activity is often
stronger in the left hemisphere (cf. Damasio,
Tranel, Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2004;
Scott & Wise, 2004). As one possible explana-
tion, we suggest that unconscious processing
of words might recruit language areas in a
different fashion than visible words, leading
to measurable activation in the right hemi-
sphere (e.g., Grossi & Coch, 2005; Holcomb &
Grainger, 2006). Another possible explanation
might be that the activity results from an inhi-
bition of word processing due to the masking.
Such inhibition has been observed previously
in masking studies (Eckstein, Kubat, & Perrig,
2011; Wentura & Frings, 2005). The other two
areas, i.e. parietal lobe and posterior opercu-
lum, have also occasionally been reported to
differentiate between words and nonwords or
pseudowords (Compton et al., 1991; Hauk et
al., 2006; Salmelin et al., 1996). It is however
unusual to find higher activation for nonwords
than words, especially in language areas in
the left hemisphere. Given that the primes
were not readable for the participants, it is
possible that this difference in activity just
represents a difference in resource allocation
or in timing. That is, higher allocation of re-
sources was needed to convert substrings of
nonword primes to phonemes than for word
primes and such a decoding probably took
longer for nonwords than for words, which
would explain the late timing. The sources of
activation found with the LORETA model could
thus tentatively reflect word recognition pro-
cesses that are known to occur in the 136 to
256 ms time range or earlier components that
were delayed, but we infer this with caution, as
the temporal and parietal activation appeared
to be in the right but not in the left hemisphere.
Although LORETA source models are not
suited to make direct inferences as to which
processes are responsible for word-nonword
ERP differences, it is possible to compare
LORETA solutions for different conditions in
order to identify similarities and differences
in modelled brain activations. Therefore, the
masked stimuli LORETA solution for ERPs av-
eraged over the 136 to 256 ms time seg-
ment was compared with the nonmasked stim-
uli LORETA solution for ERPs averaged over
the 200 to 252 ms time segment (cf. Fig. 4).
There was a small area of overlap in right su-
perior temporal lobe which discriminated be-
tween words and nonwords for masked as well
as for nonmasked stimuli (maximal t values
at MNI coordinates 46/-18/1 and 53/-18/8 for
masked and nonmasked stimuli, respectively).
We tentatively suggest that this overlap repre-
sents a common process that was active in this
time range, whereas the non-overlap of other
areas indicate that most processes differenti-
ating between words and nonwords were not
shared when observing masked compared to
nonmasked stimuli in this specific task.
In summary, differences were found be-
tween ERPs of masked words and ERPs of
masked nonwords, and the source of these
differences was located in an area that was
also found as source with visible words and
nonwords. Compared to visible stimuli how-
ever, differences were small. Given that mirror
masked patterns look like nonsense patterns
or unknown hieroglyphs, ERPs measured
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while participants see mirror masked words
primarily reflect processes that lead to the
conscious experience of seeing nonsense pat-
terns. It is therefore not surprising that most of
the ERP differences found between words and
nonwords are different for masked compared
to nonmasked stimuli. The task used did not
require lexical processing of the mirror masked
stimuli. Nevertheless, some of the processes
involved in perception of masked stimuli ap-
peared to differentiate between words and
nonwords, indicating that some aspects of
words are automatically processed even if
there is no direct requirement for processing.
This study has shown that it is possible to
monitor the time course of nonconscious pro-
cessing of words vs. nonwords. Because
words were presented only once during the
experiment, we can exclude stimulus learning
effects as a source of nonconscious percep-
tion. Hence, our results evidence that masked
words were spontaneously ’read’ up to a cer-
tain level, although they were consciously per-
ceived as meaningless patterns. Further re-
search will be needed in order to identify the
stages of word processing involved in noncon-
scious processing of mirror masked words. We
have done a few ERP and behavioural experi-
ments that indicate that phonological process-
ing is involved in the effect of mirror masked
priming. It might be also appropriate to con-
duct some comparative studies to determine if
the same processes occur with mirror mask-
ing (which is based on attentional distraction)
compared to temporal pattern masking (which
is based on perceptual thresholding). At the
moment however, mirror masking appears to
be a potential alternative to temporal masking,
especially when there is need for longer pre-
sentation durations.
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Abstract
M. Wagner & W.-J. Kuo (Hamburg, Germany & Taipei, Taiwan) – Population-Adapted Averaged
Head Templates for EEG and MEG Source Analysis
In electroencephalography or magnetoencephalography source localization studies where individual sub-
ject’s magnetic resonance images (MRIs) are not available, averaged MRIs can be used instead. For pop-
ulations of subjects with head shapes that are both homogeneous and sufficiently distinct from the head
shape of an existing averaged MRI, the use of a population-adapted, averaged MRI is desirable. Examples
for such populations are non-Caucasian or pediatric subjects. A population-adapted, averaged MRI can
be created based on individual MRIs of subjects representing the population of interest. The extents of the
bounding box containing the brain, together with the locations of the anterior and posterior commissure
landmarks are measures facilitating this process. Based on their average values for the individual MRIs, it
is possible to average these individual MRIs. Alternatively and also based on these measures, an existing
averaged MRI can be adapted to better match the population’s head shape. Based on individual MRIs of
62 Chinese subjects, the procedure is demonstrated, including the creation of standard electrode locations
and realistically shaped boundary element method head models.
Keywords: Magnetic resonance imaging; Electroencephalography; Magnetoencephalography; Source
localization; Averaged MRI; Talairach Co-registration
Population-Adapted
Averaged Head Templates for
EEG and MEG Source
Analysis
M. Wagner ∗1, W.-J. Kuo∗2
1Compumedics Germany GmbH,
Heußweg 25, 20255 Hamburg, Germany,
2Institute of Neuroscience,
National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan
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Introduction
In electroencephalography (EEG) and
magnetoencephalography (MEG) source anal-
ysis, medical image data such as magnetic
resonance images (MRIs) can be utilized in
a variety of ways. Localization accuracy is
increased by means of individual, realistically
shaped head models (Fuchs, Drenckhahn,
Wischmann, & Wagner, 1998; Mosher, Leahy,
& Lewis, 1999). Source analysis results can
be displayed in their anatomical context by
overlaying them onto structural brain mages
such as MRI (Fuchs, Wagner, Wischmann,
Ottenberg, & Dössel, 1994). Furthermore,
anatomical features such as the gray matter
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may be used to constrain source analysis
(Dale & Sereno, 1993; Wagner, Fuchs, Wis-
chmann, Ottenberg, & Dössel, 1995).
Often, however, individual MRI data are not
available or shall deliberately not be used. The
latter can for example be the case in group
studies, where performing source analyses in
individual anatomical space and later pooling
the results is more laborious than performing
source analyses in a common, representative
anatomical space. In such cases, it is good
practice to use averaged MRI datasets instead
(Fuchs, Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & Eber-
sole, 2002; Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi, &
Lehmann, 2002): An averaged MRI dataset
(also commonly called an MRI template)
shows anatomical features that are common
to a population of subjects, without suggesting
a level of detail (cortical folds) that could only
be obtained by using the subject’s own MRI.
An averaged MRI still makes it possible to de-
rive and use realistically shaped head models,
view source results in their anatomical context,
and constrain source analysis (albeit not to the
level of cortical folds).
Today, a commonly used averaged MRI is
the ICBM-152 dataset (Mazziotta et al., 2001),
also called the Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (MNI) brain. It represents an average
Caucasian head shape. A consequence of
the widespread use of the ICBM-152 is the
availability of additional, co-registered three-
dimensional (3-D) maps detailing e.g. tis-
sue type probabilities (Mazziotta, Toga, Evans,
Fox, & Lancaster, 1995) or cytoarchitectonic
atlas information (Lancaster et al., 2000; Fig-
ure 1a). This availability makes it straightfor-
ward to guide source analysis based on tissue
types, e.g. to constrain sources to the cortical
gray matter, or to relate source analysis results
to atlas information.
Another important reference frame is the
Talairach atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988),
which is based on axial cross-sections of a
single subject’s brain. It includes detailed
anatomical labels. The proportional grid-
based coordinate system introduced in this
publication has become the de-facto standard
for reporting locations in the brain. The Ta-
lairach coordinate system is based on two
landmarks, the anterior commissure (AC),
which serves as the origin, and the posterior
commissure (PC), together with the extents
of the bounding box containing the brain.
The mid-sagittal and the axial plane through
AC and PC, together with the coronal planes
through AC and PC, respectively, subdivide
this bounding box into twelve cuboid-shaped
compartments. Using a linear transformation
per compartment, any brain, including the
ICBM-152, can be co-registered with the Ta-
lairach reference frame (Desco et al., 2001,
Lancaster et al., 2007). Figure 1b shows the
Talairach bounding box overlaid onto an axial
slice of the ICBM-152, while Figure 2 shows a
3-D rendering of the bounding box.
In order to bring EEG electrode or MEG
sensor locations into the anatomical reference
frame of an averaged MRI, a landmark-based
transformation can be applied (Fuchs, M., Wis-
chmann, Wagner, & Krüger, 1995). Alterna-
tively, and only available in the EEG case, elec-
trode locations based on the 10-20 system
(Jasper, 1958) or one of its extensions (Cha-
trian, 1985; Oostenveld & Praamstra, 2001)
can be determined by measuring distances
on the averaged MRI’s segmented skin and
relating their locations to the actually mea-
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) an axial slice of the ICBM-152 averaged T1-weighted MRI dataset with overlaid Talairach
atlas information where shades of gray encode anatomical features. (b) ICBM-152 slice with overlaid
Talairach coordinate system bounding box through the locations of AC and PC.
sured data by means of label-matching (Wag-
ner, Fuchs, & Kohlhoff, 1996).
In EEG analysis using an averaged MRI
dataset, it is desirable to use electrode lo-
cations as close to the surface of the skin
as possible. Else, electrode locations, head
model, and the averaged MRI’s anatomy would
not match well: In the case of a (realistically
shaped) head model based on the averaged
MRI, electrodes need to be located on the
head model’s skin surface, while in the case
of a (typically spherical) head model fitted to
the electrodes, source results overlaid onto the
MRI would be wrong.
The underlying problem is that of a possible
shape mismatch between the averaged MRI
dataset and the individual subject’s head. It
also exists in the MEG case. It is only triv-
ial if a global spatial scaling factor suffices.
A global scaling factor can easily be factored
into all known head model calculations (Fuchs,
Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & Ebersole, 2002),
but can only account for different overall head
sizes. More general shape dissimilarities be-
tween individual and averaged MRI’s head
shape still lead to errors in head modeling, re-
sult overlay, and anatomical constraints.
There are situations where systematic differ-
ences between individual subject’s heads and
a standard averaged MRI such as the ICBM-
152 occur. This is for example the case in
studies involving elderly or pediatric subjects
or subjects with psychiatric diseases, but also
if non-Caucasian subjects are analyzed. In
such cases, the use of an averaged MRI that is
better suited for the subject’s heads is advised.
In this paper, we describe a procedure for
creating averaged MRIs for populations that
exhibit such systematic differences, based on
individual MRIs of subjects representative of
the population. Such a population-specific
averaged MRI will also be called MRI-A or
MRI-XX-A with XX the number of individual
MRIs that were used for averaging. The pro-
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Figure 2: 3-D rendering of the Talairach bounding box with the AC and PC landmarks. The mid-sagittal
plane through AC and PC, the axial plane through AC and PC, and the two coronal planes through AC
and PC, respectively, define twelve compartments used for the piece-wise linear transformation between
individual subject and Talairach coordinates.
posed procedure was designed to accomplish
the following aims:
1) The averaged MRI should clearly show
prominent features such as the brain, the skull,
and the skin layers, equalizing within-group
head shape variations. Therefore, individ-
ual MRIs need to be spatially normalized be-
fore averaging, so that matching features co-
localize.
2) Furthermore, each individual MRI should
have the same impact on the resulting aver-
age, independent of its overall intensity. This
implies that MRI intensities have to be normal-
ized before averaging.
3) The co-registration of averaged MRIs to
the Talairach atlas as well as to averaged MRIs
of different subject populations and to indi-
vidual MRIs should be straightforward. This
makes the Talairach landmarks and bounding
boxes a natural choice as the basis of co-
registration.
4) Group-intrinsic head shapes and brain di-
mensions should be preserved in the resulting
average, making it necessary to spatially nor-
malize individual MRIs to the average popula-
tion’s brain dimensions before averaging.
5) As an alternative to or extension of creat-
ing an averaged MRI from the individual MRIs
used, it should be possible to spatially nor-
malize an existing averaged MRI such as the
ICBM-152 to match the population of inter-
est. The result is a version of the ICBM-152
that exhibits a head shape and size match-
ing the population of interest. This population-
specific ICBM-152-based dataset will also be
called an adapted ICBM-152 dataset or ICBM-
152-A. For some populations (e.g. in pediatric
studies), other existing templates besides the
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ICBM-152 dataset might be preferable candi-
dates for adaptation.
6) In preparation of an EEG or MEG study,
the resulting averaged MRI dataset should be
used to create a population-specific realisti-
cally shaped head model, and used as a ba-
sis for calculating the 10-20 electrode system
positions on the shape of its segmented skin.
7) Finally, creating the averaged MRI should
require little user interaction so that it can eas-
ily be applied for a given population.
Existing approaches for creating averaged
MRI datasets are summarized in (Toga &
Thompson, 2001). Most approaches achieve
this by means of a template and use high-
parametric, non-linear transformations (Klein
et al., 2009), which allow a mapping of sub-
cortical structures between individual and
averaged MRI, but introduces the problem
of choosing the right template to match the
population-of-interest. The specific goals of
this study in the context of EEG and MEG
analysis gives the mapping of sub-cortical
structures a lower priority, with the benefit that
a template-free ansatz can be pursued, where
image data are normalized onto the average
of their Talairach bounding boxes.
In order to demonstrate the procedure, 62
individual MRIs of ethnic Chinese subjects
have been processed and an averaged Chi-
nese MRI-62-A dataset as well as an adapted
ICBM-152-A dataset have been created
Previous studies (Tang et al., 2010; Chee
et al., 2009; Kochunov et al., 2003) have al-
ready established that significant differences
between Chinese and Caucasian head shapes
exist. One previous study also created an
averaged Chinese MRI dataset (Tang et al.,
2010) but used a different co-registration tech-
nique, which involved matching all MRIs onto
one MRI randomly selected from the popula-
tion of interest as an intermediate step. Fur-
thermore, this study did not demonstrate atlas
co-registration nor the derivation of head mod-
els and electrode layouts.
Methods
MRI Acquisition
The subject sample consisted of 62 subjects
(37 females and 25 males), with an average
age of 22.4 years and a standard deviation
(SD) of 2.1 years. At this age, all subjects
had already attained their adult head shapes
(Friede, 1981). All subjects were right-handed
ethnic Chinese with no history of neurological
disorders. Handedness was verified using the
Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All sub-
jects negated when asked for psychiatric dis-
eases. Written consent of the participants was
obtained before MRI scanning, with the proto-
col approved by the Institutional Ethics and Ra-
diation Safety Committees of National Yang-
Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan.
Whole-head T1-weighted MRI datasets of all
subjects were acquired at the Laboratory of
Cognitive Neural Science, Yang-Ming Univer-
sity, Taipei, Taiwan. A magnetization-prepared
rapid gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence run
on a 3T TrioTim scanner (Siemens, Erlan-
gen, Germany) was used for the acquisition.
The pixel dimensions and slice thickness were
1 mm each. The matrix size was 224x256, re-
sulting in a field-of-view (FOV) of 224x256 mm.
The number of slices was 192.
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Landmark and Bounding Box
Determination
MRI data were loaded into the Curry 7 soft-
ware (Compumedics, Charlotte, NC, USA). In
Curry, the locations of AC and PC were de-
termined manually. An additional mid-sagittal
landmark (MS) in a more superior slice al-
lowed, together with AC and PC, to define
the mid-sagittal plane. Based on this in-
formation, the 3-D bounding box containing
the brain was gauged, comprising the fol-
lowing distance measures: AC-Anterior, PC-
Posterior, AC-Superior, AC-Inferior, AC-Left,
and AC-Right, in addition to the AC-PC dis-
tance already obtained. The averages of these
measures were computed and compared to
their equivalents in the ICBM-152 template
and the Talairach atlas. A two-tailed z-test was
used to assess whether the observed differ-
ences are significant.
Averaged MRI Dataset and Adapted
ICBM-152
Each MRI was then re-sliced according to the
coordinate axes spanned by AC, PC, and the
mid-sagittal plane, and its twelve sub-volumes
defined by AC, PC, and the bounding box di-
mensions were individually, linearly and con-
tiguously transformed. For details on this pro-
cess, please refer to the Appendix. The av-
erage measures obtained in the previous step
were used as the dimensions of the target
bounding box. The outcome was 62 volumet-
ric images with identical locations of AC and
PC landmarks, identical mid-sagittal planes,
and identical bounding boxes enclosing the
brains. In these images, all brains occu-
pied the same coordinate space. Then, MRI
intensities were linearly scaled so that the
99th intensity percentile was the same across
datasets. The 99th percentile was chosen as
a noise-insensitive measure of the maximum.
Finally, an averaged 3-D image was computed
which will be called the MRI-62-A in the re-
mainder of the paper.
In the same way as described above for
the individual MRIs, the ICBM-152 was trans-
formed such that its AC-PC distance as well as
its Talairach bounding box extents matched the
average values of the subject population, yield-
ing an ICBM-152-A dataset. Figure 3 shows
this procedure in a flowchart.
Electrode Locations and Head Models
For the original and the adapted ICBM-152
as well as for the MRI-62-A, the locations of
the nasion, left and right pre-auricular point,
and inion landmarks were determined. Based
on these landmarks and the skin surface seg-
mented from MRI, electrode locations for the
extended 10-20 system were computed by the
Curry software (Wagner, Fuchs, & Kohlhoff,
1996). Computations included measuring and
subdividing distances on the outer surface of
the segmented skin, replicating the proce-
dure for manual electrode placement (Jasper,
1958; Chatrian, 1985). As a result, for these
three datasets, 86 electrode locations were ob-
tained, identified by their labels. These 86
electrode locations included ten sub-temporal
locations, which could not be reliably esti-
mated for the ICBM-152 and ICBM-152-A be-
cause of their limited inferior extensions. For
the remaining 76 electrodes, the average and
standard deviation of the distances between
electrodes of the same label were determined
across all three datasets.
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Figure 3: Flowchart for creating the MRI-A and ICBM-152-A datasets.
In a next step, realistically shaped three-
compartment boundary element method
(BEM) head models were created using the
automatic BEM geometry setup algorithm
implemented in the Curry software (Wagner,
Fuchs, Drenckhahn, Wischmann, Köhler, &
Theißen, 1997). Triangle side lengths for the
inner skull, outer skull, and the skin boundary
were 5 mm, 7 mm, and 8 mm, respectively.
As a byproduct of this algorithm, triangle
meshes representing the skin and the cortex
are obtained.
Results
Chinese vs. Caucasian Brain Dimensions
Table 1 lists averages, standard deviations,
and medians of the AC-PC distances, bound-
ing box extents, and bounding box volumes ob-
tained for the 62 individual MRIs and compares
them with their counterparts for the Talairach
atlas and the ICBM-152. Comparing the 62
Chinese subjects with the Talairach atlas, all
bounding box extents as well as the width-to-
length and height-to-length ratios turn out to
be significantly different; the bounding box vol-
ume and the height-to-width ratio, however, are
not. A comparison with the ICBM-152 dimen-
sions shows significant differences for all but
the mediolateral dimensions and the height-to-
length ratio.
For a trained user, it took about two min-
utes per dataset to define the landmarks and
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Table 1: Chinese vs. Caucasian Brain Dimensions. Averages, standard deviations (SD), and medians
of the AC-PC distances, bounding box extents, bounding box volumes, and bounding box extent ratios
obtained for the 62 individual MRIs together with their counterparts for the Talairach atlas and the ICBM-
152 dataset. Length is the sum of the anterior, posterior, and AC-PC distances. Width is the sum of the
left and right extents. Height is the sum of the superior and inferior extents. W/L is the width-to-height-
ratio. H/L is the height-to-length-ratio. H/W is the height-to-width-ratio. Probability values p for the
Null hypothesis obtained by means of a two-tailed z-test are shown for the Talairach and the ICBM-152































Average 67.7 70.2 24.4 75.0 45.0 70.4 70.5 162.3 120.0 140.9 2.75 0.870 0.741 0.853
SD 2.5 4.3 1.0 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.6 6.7 4.2 4.9 0.23 0.044 0.029 0.033
Median 67.6 70.5 24.5 74.2 45.2 70.5 70.5 162.5 119.3 141.0 2.73 0.865 0.738 0.854
Talairach 70.0 79.0 23.0 74.0 42.0 68.0 68.0 172.0 116.0 136.0 2.71 0.791 0.674 0.853
p≤ 10−5 10−5 10−5 0.005 10−5 10−5 10−5 10−5 10−5 10−5 0.233 10−5 10−5 0.926
ICBM 71.0 78.0 28.0 83.0 47.0 70.0 70.0 177.0 130.0 140.0 3.22 0.791 0.734 0.929
p≤ 10−5 10−5 10−5 10−5 10−5 0.215 0.132 10−5 10−5 0.141 10−5 10−5 0.101 10−5
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bounding box dimensions required.
Averaged MRI Dataset and Adapted
ICBM-152 Dataset
Figure 4 shows the MRI-62-A dataset based
on 62 Chinese subjects and the ICBM-152-
A. Due to the normalization of each individ-
ual dataset to the Talairach bounding box, the
MRI-A is least blurry at the locations of AC and
PC. The overall head shape of the ICBM-152-A
is the same as for the MRI-62-A. For the MRI-
62-A, the skull areas around the brain are not
everywhere as sharply delineated as for the
ICBM-152-A.
Electrode Locations and Head Models
A rendering of the three sets of extended
10-20 system electrodes obtained for the
MRI-62-A, ICBM-152, and ICBM-152-A
datasets is shown in Figure 5.
Table 2 shows the average distances and
their standard deviations together with the
median distances between electrodes of the
same label for the three pairs of datasets.
Electrode location differences are largest be-
tween the MRI-62-A and the ICBM-152. They
are smallest between the MRI-62-A and the
ICBM-152-A, with a mean displacement of
less than 5 mm.
The realistic BEM head model represent-
ing the MRI-62-A dataset consists of 12,132
triangles connecting 6,072 nodes. The ICBM-
152-A BEM contains 12,264 triangles and
6,138 nodes. Its inferior extension is smaller
than for the MRI-62-A model. Figure 6 shows
both BEMs together with cortical triangle
meshes. These cortical triangle meshes do
not show individual gyri and sulci, due to the
non-individual MRIs they were created from.
Discussion and Conclusion
The proposed procedure meets the aims pre-
sented in the introduction: As a demonstra-
tion of the proposed procedure, an averaged
MRI dataset representing a normal, adult Chi-
nese population called the MRI-62-A dataset
has been created. The MRI-62-A dataset
shows prominent features such as the brain,
the skull, and the skin layers. Group-intrinsic
head shapes and brain dimensions have been
preserved. Its co-registration to the Talairach
atlas as well as to other MRIs can be per-
formed using the same Talairach-based ap-
proach as used for averaging. A population-
specific ICBM-152-based dataset called the
ICBM-152-A has been created. It exhibits a
head shape and brain size matching the popu-
lation of interest. On the basis of the MRI-62-
A and the ICBM-152-A, realistic head models
and standard electrode layout shave been cre-
ated.
With about two minutes of user interac-
tion per individual MRI (all other calculations
were automated), the process of creating a
population-adapted averaged MRI is straight-
forward.
The size differences between Chinese and
Caucasian brains are significant, with Chinese
brains being e.g. comparatively shorter than
both the Talairach atlas brain and the ICBM-
152. These findings agree with the ones re-
ported in (Tang et al., 2010), although it should
be mentioned, that due to the brain-stripping
approach employed in that study, measures
are not directly comparable.
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Figure 4: Upper row: MRI-62-A dataset based on 62 Chinese subjects. Lower row: ICBM-152-A dataset
with the average Chinese subject’s brain dimensions.
Table 2: Average distances and their standard deviations together with the median distances between elec-
trodes of the same label for pairs of datasets. Electrode locations were obtained according to the extended







Average 11.0 4.7 7.6
SD 3.7 1.8 3.0
Median 10.8 4.8 7.6
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Figure 5: Extended 10-20 system electrodes for the ICBM-152 (light gray), the ICBM-152-A (dark gray),
and the MRI-62-A (black), together with the skin surface of MRI-62-A.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6: Realistically shaped BEM head models enclosing the cortical surface for a) the MRI-62-A
dataset and b) the ICBM-152-A dataset.
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In a population-specific EEG or MEG study,
finding significantly different brain dimensions
between the population-of-interest and an ex-
isting, candidate MRI template should motivate
the creation and use of an MRI-A or an ICBM-
152-A dataset instead of just using the tem-
plate.
An important practical question is, which
of the two adapted MRIs, the MRI-A or the
ICBM-152-A, is better suited for being used in
a given study:
Both adapted datasets can be linked to ad-
ditional atlas data because their Talairach pa-
rameters are known.
Due to the bounding box-based head shape
normalization before averaging, the quality of
the MRI-A dataset is not uniform: it is highest
around the AC and PC landmarks and where
the brain touches the planes of the bounding
box, but and lower in other areas, such as the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area
9). This is not the case for the ICBM-152-A,
because a different, template-based approach
was used for normalizing individual MRIs in the
course of the ICBM-152 creation.
Due to the larger field-of-view of the indi-
vidual MRIs used for averaging in this study,
sub-temporal electrode locations according to
the extended 10-20 system can be computed
for the MRI-62-A but not for the ICBM-152-A.
For the same reason, the MRI-62-A BEM has
a wider inferior coverage, which commends
the use of the MRI-62-A for studies involv-
ing sub-temporal electrodes. For the other 76
electrode locations, a mean difference of less
than 5 mm between both adapted datasets is
still lower than the electrode location errors
brought about by using caps with labeled elec-
trodes, so that in such a setup no clear recom-
mendation can be spelled out.
Of course, the quality of individual MRIs for
a given population may vary, so that using the
ICBM-152-A may be a welcome alternative if a
low number of individual MRIs are available or
if these are of low quality.
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that
the ICBM-152 has by now become part of the
community’s viewing habits, so that presenting
one’s results in that context may make them
easier to perceive. This is of course not true, if
the subject population is pediatric. In this case,
either an existing pediatric template (Sanchez,
Richards, & Almli 2011) may be adapted us-
ing a process analogous to the one described
above for the creation of the ICBM-152-A, or
the MRI-A should be used.
Whichever dataset is chosen for a particular
study, the possibility to use electrode locations
and a head model that are fit for the population
of interest, to overlay source results onto an
anatomical image with matching head shape,
and the possibility to use adapted atlas data
to constrain source analysis and report results
recommend using an adapted averaged MRI
for studies involving non-Caucasian or pedi-
atric populations.
While it has been shown that brain exten-
sions and standard electrode locations vary
significantly between the ICBM-152 and the
population-specific MRIs, this is only a hint
that differences in source localization are also
to be expected. A follow-up study will exam-
ine the effect of the different MRIs and their
derived head models and electrode locations
onto source localizations.
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Appendix
Transformation from MRI Space to Template
Space
The co-registration of a specific image
“dataset” (identified by the letter d) into a
common “template” space (identified by the
letter t) is described below. In the scope of this
paper, the interpretation of what the “dataset”
and “template” exactly are differs, depending
on which part of the process we are looking
at: When averaging individual MRIs to create
an MRI-A dataset, d denotes the individual
MRIs while t refers to the average space
based on measures obtained for all individual
MRIs. When creating an ICBM-152-A dataset,
d refers to the ICBM-152 dataset while, as
above, t refers to the average space based
on all individual MRIs. When transforming the
MRI-A or the ICBM-152-A to Talairach atlas
space (or vice versa), d refers to the former,
while t represents the latter.
The locations of AC and PC in template
space are tAC and tPC . tAC is always in the









where tAC−PC is the AC-PC distance. The
positive x axis points right, y points anterior,
and z points up. The bounding box dimen-
sions (see Figure 2) are given by the AC-
Anterior distance tAC−A, the PC-Posterior dis-
tance tPC−P , the already mentioned AC-PC
distance tAC−PC , the AC-Superior distance tS ,
the AC-Inferior distance tI , the AC-Left dis-
tance tL, and the AC-Right distance tR.
If t denotes Talairach space, the bounding
box dimensions (see Table I) are tAC−A =
70mm, tPC−P = 79mm, tAC−PC = 23mm,
tS = 74mm, tI = 42mm, tL = 68mm, and
tR = 68mm.
Analogously, dAC−A, dPC−P , dAC−PC , dS ,
dI , dL, and dR describe the bounding box
measures in dataset space. The locations of
AC and PC in dataset space are dAC and dPC .
Additionally, the location of a superior mid-
sagittal location, dMS serves to unambiguously
identify the orientation of the z axis.
The transformation from dataset space into
template space consists of three steps: trans-
lation, rotation, and scaling. In a first step, a
translation maps dAC , onto tAC (the origin).
Next, a rotation maps dPC onto the negative
y axis and dMS onto the y-z plane. The scal-
ing step ensures that the bounding box dimen-
sions co-localize:
x→







for y ≤ −dAC−PC
y tAC−PCdAC−PC for − dAC−PC < y ≤ 0
y tAC−AdAC−A for y > 0
z →
z tIdI for z ≤ 0z tSdS for z > 0
This scaling step ensures a contiguous map-
ping without any jumps at the compartment
boundaries.
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Abstract
M. Ruchsow (Göppingen) — Personale Identität aus Sicht der Neurowissenschaften und der ana-
lytischen Philosophie
The problem of personal identity is discussed very controversially in analytical philosophy and contempo-
rary neuroscience. Descartes’ approach was a dualism of substances (res cogitans and res extensa). This
solution was rejected by Locke and other empiricists, because substances can never be the object of pos-
sible experience. Locke proposed (autobiographic) memory as warrant of (diachronic) personal identity.
Alternatively, the criterion of bodily continuity was suggested, with body, brain or “relevant parts” of the
brain facilitating diachronic identity. As Parfit showed, both naturalistic (neuroscientific) criteria (auto-
biographic memory and “enough of the brain”) are contradictory. Taylor’s concept of narrative identity
might be a continuative approach.
Keywords: Personal Identity, Introspection, Narrative Self









Mit Beginn der Neuzeit geht der Glaube an
einen sinnvollen, identitätsstiftenden Kos-
mos zunehmend verloren. Der kanadische
Philosoph Charles Taylor sieht diese Entwick-
lung durchaus ambivalent und spricht, Max
Webers Diktum von der „Entzauberung der
Welt“ aufnehmend, von einem „Unbehagen an
der Moderne“. Aus Taylors Sicht wurde mehr
individuelle Freiheit dadurch errungen, dass
wir uns von einem älteren Moralhorizont gelöst
haben. Damit einhergehend gerieten auch die
alten Ordnungsgefüge in Misskredit und die
Vorstellung, dass die „hierarchical order in
the universe was reflected in the hierarchies
of human society“. Gleichzeitig verliehen die
alten Ordnungen aber auch „meaning to the
world and to the activities of social life“ (Taylor,
1991, S. 3). Die neuzeitliche Entwicklung führt
also zu einem Zuwachs an individueller Frei-
heit, andererseits aber auch zu einem Verlust
an Orientierung bzw. sozialer Freiheit (d.h.
Sittlichkeit im Sinne Hegels). Das Konzept der
sozialen Freiheit bzw. Sittlichkeit greift den
antiken Polisgedanken auf, demzufolge die
Bürger „had such a deep subjective attach-
ment to their polis that their social membership
could be said to constitute a central part of
their own identities“ (Neuhouser, 2000, S. 34).
Das Problem der personalen Identität ist
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also eine neuzeitliche Fragestellung, die den
geschilderten historischen Prozess zur Vo-
raussetzung hat. Typische Vertreter dieser
neuzeitlichen Konstellation sind Descartes
und Locke, für die Personen „desengagierte“
neutrale Beobachter einer weitgehend mech-
anistisch zu erklärenden äußeren Wirklichkeit
sind (vgl. Taylor, 1989, S. 143 ff.).
Nach einer kurzen Präzisierung, was in der
vorliegenden Arbeit unter „Identität“ zu verste-
hen ist, wird zunächst Descartes’ Personbe-
griff als substantielle Einheit von res cogitans
und res extensa vorgestellt. Die Ablehnung
von Substanzen als möglichen Gegenständen
von Erfahrung durch den Empiristen Locke
führt u.a. zum Problem der diachronen Iden-
tität, das er durch das Erinnerungskriterium
zu lösen versucht. Im weiteren Verlauf wird
sich zeigen, dass sowohl das Kriterium der
psychischen Kontinuität (Erinnerung) als auch
das der physischen Kontinuität (des Kör-
pers oder des Gehirns) widersprüchlich ist.
Als ein möglicherweise weiterführender Lö-
sungsansatz wird dann Taylors Konzept der
narrativen Identität erläutert.
1. Identitätsbegriffe
Der Begriff der Person ist historisch wie sys-
tematisch mit den beiden eng zusammenhän-
genden Problemkreisen der
1. Identität von Personen und der
2. Autonomie von Personen verbunden (vgl.
Krebs, Kambartel & Jantschek, 1995, S.
89 ff.).
Hinsichtlich 1.) ist zu unterscheiden zwischen
numerischer und qualitativer Identität.
Von numerischer oder logischer Identität
sprechen wir, wenn folgende Kriterien erfüllt
sind:
a.) Symmetrie (x = y→y = x),
b.) Transitivität (x = y ∧ y = z→x = z) und
c.) Reflexivität (x = x) (vgl. Gillitzer, 2001, S.
24)
Zwei Dinge sind numerisch identisch (also
der Zahl nach ein einziges Ding), wenn sie hin-
sichtlich aller ihrer Eigenschaften gleich sind.
Demgegenüber bezeichnen wir zwei ver-
schiedene Gegenstände als qualitativ iden-
tisch, wenn sie sich lediglich ähnlich, also
nur in einer bestimmten Eigenschaft (oder
mehreren) gleich sind. Numerische Identität
ist somit ein Grenzfall qualitativer Identität
(Gleichheit hinsichtlich aller Eigenschaften vs.
Gleichheit hinsichtlich einer/mehrerer Eigen-
schaften; Tugendhat & Wolf, 1983, S. 168
f.).
Hinsichtlich 2.) bleibt festzuhalten, dass
der Begriff der qualitativen Identität auch in
einer erweiterten Bedeutung gebraucht wird.
Er bezieht sich dann auf den autonomen
Lebensentwurf von Personen und die damit
einhergehenden existentiellen Fragen: „Wer
bin ich?“ und: „Wer will ich sein?“ Durch
ihre Antworten orientieren sich Personen gle-
ichzeitig in einem „moralischen Raum“ bzw.
verorten sich auf einer „moralischen Land-
karte“ (Taylor, 1989, S. 25 ff.).
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird der Termi-
nus „numerische Identität“ verwendet, wenn
die Zahl der zugrundeliegenden Entitäten rel-
evant ist, also die Frage, ob von einer oder
mehreren Personen geredet wird. Der Begriff
der „qualitativen Identität“ wird ausschließlich
in der erweiterten Bedeutung verwendet, also
wenn die qualitativen Aspekte von Personalität
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und insbesondere die moralische Dimension
von Lebensentwürfen im Vordergrund stehen
(vgl. Ruchsow & Hermle, 2007).
Es wird außerdem zwischen dem Problem
der
I synchronen und dem der
II diachronen Identität unterschieden,
also der Identität einer Person zu einem bes-
timmten Zeitpunkt und der Identität im Zeitver-
lauf.
Im Rahmen seines Substanzendualismus
war für Descartes die Lösung von I.) beson-
ders vordringlich, während II.) aufgrund der
Unveränderlichkeit von Substanzen bzw. der
Unsterblichkeit der Seele(nsubstanz) unprob-
lematisch war. Für Locke ergab sich nach
Preisgabe des Substanzbegriffs genau die
umgekehrte Problemkonstellation: II.) war
deutlich schwieriger zu lösen als I.).
2. Descartes
2.1.Descartes’ Personbegriff
Descartes gebraucht den Begriff der Per-
son eher selten (Thiel, 2011, S. 36). Wenn
Descartes von „persona“ bzw. „personne“
spricht, versteht er darunter „die Vereinigung
von (Menschen-) Körper und (Menschen-
)Geist“. Kemmerling unterscheidet in diesem
Zusammenhang drei Ichbegriffe:
1. Den Ausdruck „das Ich“, also die sub-
stantivierte „ich“-Redeweise, verwendet
Descartes, um sich auf die eigene Seele
bzw. den eigenen Geist zu beziehen,
während „ich“ sich
2. sowohl auf den eigenen Körper, als auch
3. auf die Vereinigung von eigenem Körper
und Geist bezieht, d.h. die Person (Kem-
merling, 2005, S. 123).
Den drei Ichbegriffen sind dementsprechend
drei Weisen der Erkenntnis zugeordnet:
1. Die (eigene) Seele („das Ich“) kann nur
durch den Intellekt erkannt werden. Der
reine Intellekt wird nach Descartes durch
metaphysische Gedanken trainiert, die
uns mit dem Begriff des Geistes vertraut
machen sollen.
2. Bei der Erkenntnis des (eigenen) Kör-
pers (d.h. Ausdehnung, Gestalt und
Bewegung) muss der Intellekt von der
(bildlichen) Vorstellungskraft unterstützt
werden. Die Vorstellungskraft wird vor
allem durch mathematische Studien
geschult; sie gewöhnen uns daran, deut-
liche und klare Begriffe von Körpern zu
bilden.
3. Die Person, d.h. die Vereinigung von
Körper und Geist, wird weder durch den
reinen Intellekt, noch durch den von der
Vorstellungskraft unterstützten Intellekt
adäquat erfasst. Nur „das gewöhnliche
Leben und das alltägliche Gespräch
lehren uns, die Vereinigung von Körper
und Geist zu begreifen, und zu diesem
Zwecke solle man sich tunlichst jedweder
metaphysischen und mathematischen
Betätigung enthalten (Kemmerling, 2005,
S. 124).“
An verschiedenen Stellen betont Descartes
diese enge Verbindung von Körper und
Geist, die seinen Personbegriff ausmacht.
So schreibt er in der Sechsten Meditation,
dass sich seine Seele nicht einfach in seinem
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Körper befinde wie ein Schiffer in seinem
Schiff, sondern aufs innigste mit ihm vereint
sei und ihn gleichsam durchdringe (Descartes,
1641/2009, S. 88). Wiederholt weist er darauf
hin, dass Körper und Geist eine „substantielle
Einheit“ bzw. „essentielle Einheit“ bilden (Per-
ler, 2006, S. 213). Geist und Körper sind „in
gewissem Sinn“ unvollständige Substanzen.
Zu vollständigen (funktionsfähigen) werden
sie erst in der essentiellen Einheit. Descartes
unterscheidet dementsprechend zwischen
„ens per se“ und „ens per accidens“. Wenn
zwei Substanzen zufällig miteinander verbun-
den sind („ens per accidens“) „und alle ihre
Funktionen auch unabhängig voneinander
ausüben können, bilden sie zusammen eine
akzidentelle Einheit - ein bloßes Konglom-
erat, das nicht mehr ist als die Summe seiner
beiden Bestandteile. Wenn hingegen zwei
Substanzen derart miteinander verbunden
sind, dass sie nicht alle ihre Funktionen unab-
hängig voneinander ausüben können, bilden
sie zusammen eine essentielle Einheit - et-
was Komplexes, was mehr ist als die Summe
seiner Bestandteile. Genau dies ist bei der
Verbindung von Körper und Geist der Fall“
(Perler, 2006, S. 213).
Die enge Verbindung von res cogitans und
res extensa in der Person zeigt sich insbeson-
dere im Bereich der Sinneswahrnehmung und
der Schmerzempfindung, die weder der Geist
noch der Körper allein ausüben können. Bei
der Analyse der Sinneswahrnehmung unter-
scheidet Descartes wiederum „drei Grade“
oder Stufen voneinander:
1. Eine rein körperliche Stufe, die sich bei
Tieren und Menschen findet, und durch di-
rekte Einwirkung eines Objektes auf den
Körper eine Nervenreizung verursacht.
2. Eine körperlich-geistige Stufe.
3. Eine rein geistige Stufe, die genau dann
vorliegt, wenn ein Urteil über das äußere,
auf den Körper einwirkende Objekt
gebildet wird.
Im Kontext von Descartes’ Personbegriff ist die
zweite Stufe von besonderer Bedeutung, „die
nur aufgrund der essentiellen Einheit von Kör-




Descartes’ Personbegriff muss vor dem Hin-
tergrund der aristotelisch-scholastischen Tra-
dition gesehen werden, der zufolge „eine
Person eine natürliche Substanz ist, die aus
Form und Materie besteht: Die Seele ist die
Form, der Körper die Materie“ (Perler 2006, S.
210). Im Rahmen seines hylemorphistischen
Ansatzes betrachtete Aristoteles die Seele als
Lebensprinzip, das ein Stück Materie erst zu
einem funktionierenden, lebendigen Körper
macht. Dieser Ansatz hat den Vorteil, dass die
Person von vornherein als Einheit (im Sinne
synchroner Identität) aufgefasst werden kann,
jedoch den Nachteil - insbesondere für die
christlichen Kommentatoren des Mittelalters -
dass die Seele nicht unsterblich ist, sondern
mit dem Körper untergeht.
Die spätmittelalterlichen Aristoteliker wie
z.B. Thomas von Aquin versuchten dieser
Konsequenz u.a. durch eine differenzierte
Theorie des Intellekts bzw. der Seele zu ent-
gehen. Demnach bildeten nur die „niederen“
Teile der Seele das Lebensprinzip und gehen
mit dem Tod des individuellen menschlichen
42 Human Cognitive Neurophysiology 2012, 5 (1)
M. Ruchsow — Personale Identität aus Sicht der Neurowissenschaften
Körpers zugrunde. Der Intellekt als der „er-
habene“ Teil der menschlichen Seele überlebt
den Tod und geht nicht mit dem Körper unter.
Durch eine solche Erklärung wurde versucht,
die Einheit der Person und die Unsterblichkeit
der Seele zusammen zu denken (vgl. Perler,
2006, S. 211).
Eine besonders einflussreiche Kritik an
der aristotelisch-scholastischen Lehre for-
mulierte Der Renaissancephilosoph Pietro
Pomponazzi in seiner Schrift „De Immortal-
itate Animae“ („Über die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele“) aus dem Jahr 1516. Er zeigt dort, dass
die Aristoteliker, insbesondere Thomas von
Aquin, die Seele einerseits als sehr eng mit
dem Körper verbunden dachten, andererseits
aber als eine Entität, die auch unabhängig
vom Körper existieren kann. Die Seele ist also
einmal etwas, wodurch etwas lebendig ist (ein
„quo est“) ein andermal etwas, was an sich
existiert (ein „quod est“). Nach Pomponazzi
lässt sich dieser Widerspruch im Rahmen
einer aristotelisch-scholastischen Theorie der
Person nicht auflösen.
Unklar ist, ob Descartes Pompanazzis Text
gelesen hat, auf jeden Fall war er mit der daran
anschließenden Kontroverse vertraut (vgl.
Perler, 2006, S. 212). Descartes versucht, das
von Pompanazzi formulierte Problem durch
Annahme eines Substanzendualismus (von
res cogitans und res extensa) zu lösen. Auf
diese Weise versucht er die enge Einheit von
Seele und Körper mit der Unsterblichkeit der
Seele zusammen zu denken. Dabei soll
1. sein Personbegriff, verstanden als sub-
stantielle Einheit von Körper (res extensa)
und Seele (res cogitans), den hylemor-
phistischen Ansatz der aristotelisch-
scholastischen Tradition ersetzen.
2. sein Substanzbegriff die Unsterblichkeit
der Seele garantieren, da sich Sub-
stanzen nach klassischem Verständnis
nur hinsichtlich ihrer akzidentellen Eigen-
schaften ändern können.
Für Descartes ist die Seele zudem - im Gegen-
satz zum Körper - eine besondere („reine“)
Substanz, da sie unteilbar sei (d.h. unzer-
störbar = unsterblich). So betont er „dass
wir einen Körper nur als teilbar, einen Geist
dagegen nur als unteilbar einsehen können:
Denn die Hälfte eines Geistes können wir nicht
begreifen, wie wir es doch bei jedem beliebig
kleinen Körper können; so dass wir ihre Na-
turen nicht nur als verschieden, sondern sogar
als gewissermaßen entgegengesetzt erken-
nen“ (Descartes, 1641/2009, S. 14). Aus der
Teilbarkeit (= Sterblichkeit) des Körpers folgt
also keineswegs die Vernichtung des Geistes
(= Sterblichkeit der Seele), wie Descartes
einige Zeilen später deutlich herausstellt. Je-
doch muss er den endgültigen Beweis der
Unsterblichkeit der Seele - zumindest im
Rahmen der „Meditationen“ - eingestanden-
ermaßen schuldig bleiben. Darüber hinaus
ist das Argument für die Unteilbarkeit (= Un-
sterblichkeit) der Seele nur dann stichhaltig,
wenn Descartes entweder zeigen kann, dass
1. die Zerstörung der Seele durch Teilung
die einzige Art ihres Zugrundegehens ist
oder
2. alle anderen Arten des Zugrundegehens
die menschliche Seele nicht betreffen
(Perler, 2006, S. 179 f.).
2.3. Cartesianischer Dualismus
Descartes’ dualistische Substanzenlehre ist
eine Voraussetzung seines Personbegriffs.
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Baker und Morris unterscheiden zwischen
Descartes’ Dualismus („Descartes’ Dualism“)
und dem von ihnen sogenannten Cartesian-
ischen Dualismus („Cartesian Dualism“), der
im wesentlichen auf einer Legendenbildung
(„Cartesian Legend“) im Bereich der Analytis-
chen Philosophie beruht (Baker und Morris,
2002). Zentraler Bestandteil des Cartesian-
ischen Dualismus ist die Fähigkeit zur Intro-
spektion („Cartesian Introspection“), die Baker
und Morris folgendermaßen charakterisieren:
„Physical objects are public and observable,
though fallibly, via the senses; mental ob-
jects are private and (quasi-) observable via
the infallible faculty of introspection“ (Baker
und Morris, 2002, S. 11). Auch die scharfe
Kontrastierung von „physical objects“ und
„mental objects“ gehört zur Cartesianischen
Legendenbildung: „There are two worlds, the
one populated by physical objects, the other
by mental objects.“ Physikalische Objekte
können rein mechanistisch erklärt werden
(„physical objects are essentially (bits of)
clockwork“), während mentale „Gegenstände“
als Bewusstseinszustände aufzufassen sind
(„mental objects are essentially (states of)
consciousness“; Baker und Morris, 2002, S.
11). Diese „Two-Worlds View“ führt dann zum
Problem der Interaktion von physikalischen
Gegenständen (wie z.B. dem eigenen Körper)
und Mentalzuständen, bzw. zur Asymmetrie
von Erster- und Dritter-Person-Perspektive.
So macht es zum Beispiel Sinn zu sagen
„Ich spüre meine Schmerzen“, wohingegen
der Satz „Ich spüre seine Schmerzen“ sinn-
los ist. Meine Mentalzustände sind privat,
während mir die der anderen Menschen nur
indirekt zugänglich sind (z.B. über ihr Ver-
halten). Im Rahmen der Cartesianischen
Legendenbildung sind somit die „doctrines of
’the epistemological transparency of thought’
[...] and of ’Cartesian Privacy’“ von entschei-
dender Bedeutung (Baker und Morris, 2002,
S. 19), wobei die Doktrin der epistemologis-
chen Transparenz besagt, dass „introspection
is essentially and universally infallible“ (Ryle,
1949, S. 14). „If I think, hope, remember, will,
regret, hear a noise, or feel a pain, I must, ipso
facto, know that I do so“ (Ryle, 1949, S. 158).
Die Doktrin der Cartesianischen Privatheit
führt demgegenüber nicht nur zur bere-
its beschriebenen Asymmetrie von erster-
und dritter Person, sondern ermöglicht auch
einen direkten, unmittelbaren bzw. nicht-
inferentiellen Zugang zu meinen inneren
Zuständen („by acquaintance“; s. unten).
So habe ich z.B. (aus der Ersten-Person-
Perspektive) unmittelbaren Zugang zu meinen
Schmerzen, ohne das aus meinem Verhalten
erst irgendwie erschließen zu müssen.
2.4. Erkenntnistheorie
Descartes’ Überlegungen zum Personbegriff
führten uns zu seinem substanzdualistischen
Ansatz, der wiederum aus seinen erkenntnis-
theoretischen Überlegungen resultierte. In-
sofern lässt es sich auch bei Abhandlungen
über Descartes’ Sicht der Person kaum ver-
meiden, auf seinen epistemologischen Ansatz
näher einzugehen.
Descartes’ Erkenntnistheorie ist im
wesentlichen motiviert durch die Suche nach
einem sicheren und unbezweifelbaren Funda-
ment des Wissens angesichts der Möglichkeit
eines systematischen Skeptizismus. Er be-
ginnt mit der alltäglichen Erfahrung, dass uns
unsere Sinne täuschen und dementsprechend
die meisten unserer Überzeugungen falsch
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sein können. Es ist gar nicht notwendig, „zu
zeigen, dass meine Meinungen allesamt falsch
sind, [...]; sondern weil schon allein die Ver-
nunft dazu rät, dass dem nicht völlig Sicheren
und Unzweifelhaften die Zustimmung nicht
weniger gründlich entzogen werden muss als
dem offenbar Falschen, wird es schon ausre-
ichen, alles zurückzuweisen, worin ich auch
nur irgendeinen Grund zum Zweifeln antreffe“
(Descartes, 1641/2009, S. 20).
In einem zweiten Schritt radikalisiert
Descartes die Möglichkeit des Zweifels, indem
er feststellt, „dass der Wachzustand niemals
aufgrund sicherer Anzeichen vom Traum
unterschieden werden kann“ (Descartes,
1641/2009, S. 21).
Als dritten Zweifelsgrund nennt Descartes
die Möglichkeit, dass mich Gott bzw. ein
böser Dämon täuscht, so dass ich mich frage,
ob „es überhaupt keine Erde, keinen Himmel,
kein ausgedehntes Ding, keine Gestalt, keine
Größe, keinen Ort gibt - und all dies mir trotz-
dem genau so wie jetzt zu existieren scheint?“
(Descartes, 1641/2009, S. 22).
Bekanntermaßen findet Descartes’ system-
atischer Zweifel zu Beginn der Zweiten Med-
itation im Cogito, d.h. in der Selbstgewis-
sheit des Ichs sein Ende, indem „festgestellt
werden muss, dass dieser Grundsatz Ich bin,
ich existiere, sooft er von mir ausgesprochen
oder durch den Geist begriffen wird, notwendig
wahr ist“ (Descartes, 1641/2009, S. 28). Aus
dem Cogito Argument leitet Descartes eine
Hierarchisierung des Wissens ab. Das Wis-
sen über unsere Mentalzustände (mittels Intro-
spektion) ist gewisser und grundlegender als
das Wissen über äußere Gegenstände (mit-
tels Sinneswahrnehmung): „Wenn ich etwa
aufgrund dessen, dass ich ihn berühre oder
sehe, urteile, dass der Erdboden existiert, so
ist daraus sicherlich noch viel mehr abzuleiten,
dass mein Geist existiert: Es ist nämlich vielle-
icht möglich, dass ich urteile, den Boden zu
berühren, obwohl gar kein Erdboden existiert,
nicht jedoch, dass ich dieses Urteil fälle, und
mein Geist, der dieses Urteil fällt, nicht sei [...]“
(Descartes, 1644/2005, S. 19 ff.).
Diese Priorisierung introspektiven Wissens
führte dazu, Descartes’ erkenntnistheoretis-
che Position als
• fundamentalisch und
• internalistisch zu charakterisieren.
Descartes’ Fundamentalismus („foundational-
ism“) zeigt sich vor allem in seiner Auffassung,
dass das mittels Introspektion gewonnene
Wissen unmittelbarer, sicherer und zuverläs-
siger ist, als das mittels Sinneswahrnehmung,
was impliziert, dass ersteres als das Funda-
ment für letzteres aufzufassen ist: Descartes
„sees self-knowledge as providing a founda-
tion for the thinker’s general body of knowl-
edge“ (Gertler, 2011, S. 33).
Der (epistemologische) Internalismus lässt
sich folgendermaßen charakterisieren:
• „Epistemic internalists (generally) accept,
and externalists deny, that knowledge re-
quires that one has accessible reasons for
one’s belief, whereas externalism rejects
this access requirement.“
• „[...] knowledge must be supported by
reasons that are within the thinker’s mind“
(Gertler, 2011, S. 31 f.).
Legt man die klassische Wissensdefinition
Platons als wahre, gerechtfertigte Meinung
(vgl. Platon, Theätet, 201d-206b) zugrunde,
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dann unterscheiden sich (epistemologische)
Internalisten und Externalisten primär hin-
sichtlich des Rechtfertigungsbegriffs; der
Internalist findet die Rechtfertigungsgründe
für seine Wissensansprüche ausschließlich
„im Kopf“, während dies für den Externalisten
nicht gilt. Da Descartes beide internalistischen
Kriterien erfüllt, wird er von vielen als „the arch
internalist“ (z.B. Gertler, 2011, S. 32), aber
auch als ein paradigmatischer Vertreter eines
„klassischen“ Fundamentalismus gesehen.
Als „klassisch“ wird ein Fundamentalismus
bezeichnet, wenn er postuliert, dass
• „das Fundament aller Rechtfertigung [von
Wissensansprüchen; Ergänzung: M.R]
aus unfehlbaren und unanfechtbaren
Überzeugungen besteht“,
• wobei „diese basalen Überzeugungen so
beschaffen sind, dass sie selbst einen
Grund für die Einsicht in ihre Wahrheit
liefern“ (Grundmann, 2008, S. 284).
Internalismus und Fundamentalismus sind
Möglichkeiten, einem grundsätzlichen erken-
ntnistheoretischen Trilemma zu entgehen, das
in der Antike als Agrippas Trilemma, und in der
gegenwärtigen Diskussion als Münchhausen-
Trilemma bekannt ist (Albert, 1991, S. 15).
Möchte ich z.B. Überzeugung A rechtfertigen,
kann ich das mit Hilfe einer weiteren Überzeu-
gung B tun, wenn sich A aus B inferenziell
erschließen lässt. Wodurch wird jedoch B
gerechtfertigt? Es gibt drei Möglichkeiten, die
alle inakzeptabel sind:
1. Unendlicher Regress: B wird durch C, C
durch D gerechtfertigt, usw. ad infinitum.
2. Rechtfertigungszirkel: B, der Grund für A,
wird wiederum durch A selbst gerechtfer-
tigt.
3. Abbruch der inferenziellen Begründun-
gen: B, unser Grund für A, wird nicht
weiter gerechtfertigt, sondern (willkürlich)
als evident, intuitiv einleuchtend, basal,
etc. deklariert.
Es ist intuitiv einleuchtend, dass Descartes’ in-
ternalistischer Fundamentalismus Möglichkeit
3 favorisiert. Descartes’ Idee, dass Perso-
nen mittels Introspektion einen privilegierten
Zugang zu ihren Mentalzuständen haben und
mit diesen unmittelbar (d.h. nicht-inferentiell)
bekannt sind (im Sinne von „acquaintance“),
ist nicht nur von philosophiehistorischem Inter-
esse. Auch in den gegenwärtigen Diskussio-
nen ist Descartes’ Grundidee, den Personbe-
griff mit der Fundierung von Erkenntnistheorie
zu verbinden, von großer Relevanz und wird
kontrovers diskutiert.
2.5. Moderne Versionen des
internalistsischen Fundamentalismus
Viele Philosophen des „Wiener Kreises“ und
aus der Frühphase der analytischen Philoso-
phie vertraten Versionen des internalistischen
Fundamentalismus. So war Russell der Auf-
fassung - ähnlich wie Descartes (vgl. das
Zitat aus den „Prinzipien“, siehe oben, Ab-
schnitt 2.4) - dass zwar an der Existenz der
Gegenstände der Außenwelt gezweifelt wer-
den kann, nicht aber an der Realität unserer
Sinneswahrnehmungen: „We have seen that it
is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether
there is a table at all, whereas it is not possible
to doubt the sense-data“ (Russell, 1912, S.
74). Sinneswahrnehmungen („sense-data“)
sind als Mentalzustände aufzufassen, von
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denen wir unmittelbare Kenntnis („acquain-
tance“) besitzen: „[...] Russell claims that
awareness of sense data is direct, whereas
awareness of tables is indirect.“ Das führt
dazu, dass „sense data ’stand between’ you
and the table, so to speak, that your aware-
ness of the table is only indirect. Sense data
play this mediating role in every example of
perceptual awareness, [...]“ (Gertler, 2011, S.
89).
Parrallel zu Russell hat auch Moore ab 1910
eine Theorie der Sinnesdaten vertreten. Auch
er plädiert dafür, zwischen Wahrnehmung
und den von dieser unabhängig existieren-
den Gegenständen zu unterscheiden: „[...] in
every sensation or idea we must distinguish
two elements, (1) the ’object’, or that in which
one differs from another; and (2) ’conscious-
ness’, or that which all have in common - that
which makes them sensations or mental facts“
(Moore, 1903/1993, S. 37).
In analoger Weise sind auch für Carnap
Sätze der Realwissenschaften (Physik, Psy-
chologie, etc.) rückführbar auf das wirklich
Gegebene. Er schreibt: „Jeder Satz der Wis-
senschaft muss sich bei logischer Analyse als
sinnvoll bewähren. Dabei wird entweder ge-
funden, dass es sich um eine Tautologie oder
um eine Kontradiktion (Negation einer Tautolo-
gie) handelt; dann gehört der Satz zum Ge-
biet der Logik einschließlich der Mathematik.
Oder der Satz ist eine gehaltvolle Aussage,
d.h. weder tautologisch noch kontradiktorisch;
dann ist es ein empirischer Satz. Er ist zurück-
führbar auf das Gegebene und daher grund-
sätzlich als wahr oder falsch entscheidbar“
(Carnap, 1931, S. 25 f.).
Bereits im „Logischen Aufbau der Welt“
(1928) entwickelte Carnap ein Konstitution-
ssystem, das die Rückführung aller wis-
senschaftlichen Begriffe auf „unmittelbar
Gegebenes“ erlauben sollte. Unmittelbar
gegeben sind Carnap zufolge „die Bewusst-
seinsvorgänge oder Erlebnisse des Ichs“.
Diese bezeichnet er als „Elementarerleb-
nisse“; sie sollen „ihrem Wesen nach unz-
erlegbare Einheiten“ darstellen, die „einfach
so hinzunehmen“ sind, „wie sie sich geben“
(Carnap, 1928/1998, S. S. 86 ff.).
Eine (zeitgenössische) Version der „Ac-
quaintance Theory of Self-Knowledge“ wird
z.B. von Fumerton vertreten. Zum unmittel-
baren, d.h. nicht-inferentiellen Wissen schreibt
er. „My suggestion is that one has a noninfer-
entially justified belief that P when one has the
thought that P and one is acquainted with the
fact that P“ (Fumerton, 1995, S. 75).
Die „Acquaintance Theory of Self-
Knowledge“ lässt sich somit folgendermaßen
zusammenfassen:
• Aufgrund unmittelbarer Kenntnis („ac-
quaintance“) sind wir mit unseren Sinnes-
daten vertraut, z.B. dass wir Schmerzen
haben.
• Aufgrund unmittelbarer Kenntnis sind wir
zu dem Urteil „Ich habe Schmerzen“, bzw.
„Schmerz ist vorhanden“ gelangt.
• Aufgrund unmittelbarer Kenntnis sind wir
uns der Korrespondenz zwischen un-
serem Schmerzempfinden und unserem
Urteil „Schmerz ist vorhanden“ bewusst
(Gertler, 2011, S. 101).
Die Methode der Introspektion ist nicht nur für
die Erkenntnistheorie und die Philosophie des
Geistes von großem Interesse, sondern auch
für die modernen Neurowissenschaften. Dies
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soll im nächsten Abschnitt kurz referiert wer-
den.
Introspektion und Neurowissenschaften
Die Frage, ob die Introspektion eine zuver-
lässige und damit zulässige wissenschaftliche
Methode ist, wird seit Beginn des 20sten
Jahrhunderts sehr unterschiedlich bewertet.
Der Behaviorismus und sein Nachfolger, der
kognitive Funktionalismus, „declared war
on introspective psychology.“ (Schwitzgebel,
2010, Zugriff: 03.02.2012) Es wurden im
Wesentlichen vier Einwände vorgebracht:
1. „Introspective claims are unreliable be-
cause they are not regularly replicated in
others.
2. Subjects confabulate (make up stories)
about what is going on in themselves
when they need to do so to make sense
of behaviour.
3. Introspection has access only to a tiny
fraction of what is going on in oneself cog-
nitively.
4. It is impossible for introspection to access
brain states“ (Brook & Mandik, 2004, S.
390).
Die Unzuverlässigkeit introspektiver Berichte
(Einwand 1.) ist Gegenstand von Wittgen-
steins Privatsprachenargument, das im folgen-
den Abschnitt 2.6. ausführlich diskutiert wer-
den wird.
Brooks und Mandiks Einwände 2. und
3. fanden ab Anfang der 1960er Jahre
zunehmend empirische Bestätigung in Experi-
menten, in denen die Methode der Introspek-
tion selbst zum Untersuchungsgegenstand
wurde. Es zeigte sich insbesondere, dass
viele höherstufige kognitive Prozesse intro-
spektiv nicht zugänglich sind, wodurch sich die
„anti-introspectivist view“ unter kognitiven Psy-
chologen deutlich verstärkte. Mandler (1975,
S. 245) fasst die Resultate dieser Experimente
folgendermaßen zusammen: „There are many
systems that cannot be brought into con-
sciousness, and probably most systems that
analyze the environment in first place have
that characteristic. In most of these cases,
only the products of cognitive and mental
activities are available to consciousness.“
Der Bostoner Philosoph Daniel Dennett
(1991, S. 122) kommt zu einer ähnlichen
Einschätzung. Wir können nicht direkt
wahrnehmen, „[...] what happens on our
retinas, in our ears, on the surface of our skin.
What we actually experience is a product of
many processes of interpretation - editorial
processes, in effect.“ Dies hat Implikationen
für die Bedeutung der Introspektion und den
Cartesianischen Fundamentalismus insge-
samt: „There is no single, definitive ’stream of
consciousness’, because there is no central
Headquarters, no Cartesian Theatre where ’it
all comes together’ for the perusal of a Cen-
tral Meaner. Instead of such a single stream
(however wide), there are multiple channels in
which specialist circuits try, in parallel pande-
moniums, to do their various things, creating
Multiple Drafts as they go“ (Ebd., S. 253 f.).
Aus Brooks und Mandiks Einwand 4. zieht
der Philosoph und Kognitionsforscher Paul
Churchland den gegenteiligen Schluss, näm-
lich dass Personen mit „[...] sufficient neu-
roscientific education can introspect his or
her brain states as brain states“ (zit. nach:
Mandik, 2006, S. 66). Churchland vertritt
seine „Introspection Thesis“ im Rahmen eines
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eliminativen Materialismus, der unser laien-
haftes psychologisches Vokabular („folk psy-
chology“) für überflüssig und irreführend hält.
Eine elaborierte zukünftige Kognitions- und
Neurowissenschaft muss nicht mehr auf du-
biose mentale Entitäten rekurrieren, sondern
spricht stattdessen von neuronalen Zustän-
den. Möchten wir an uns vertrauten Begrif-
fen wie z.B. „Introspektion“ festhalten, dann
referieren diese nicht mehr auf Psychisches
sondern notwendigerweise auf Physisches.
Churchlands eliminativer Materialismus bzw.
Naturalismus ist von verschiedenen Seiten
nachhaltig kritisiert worden (z.B: Keil, 1993),
was im Rahmen dieser Arbeit jedoch nicht
vertieft werden kann.
Mit dem zunehmenden Einfluss der
Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften kam
es zu einer Kehrtwende; die Methode der
Introspektion wurde wieder „salonfähig“, ins-
besondere im Bereich der Emotionsforschung,
des „Mental Imagery“ und der sogenannten
„Consciousness Studies“, die alle essentiell
auf „subjective reports of experience“, also
verbale „introspektive“ Berichte von Proban-
den, angewiesen sind. Dies hat die paradoxe
Konsequenz, „that neuroscience, the most sci-
entific of approaches to human nature to date,
has been forced to fall back onto a technique
rejected as unscientific over 100 years ago!“
(Brook & Mandik, 2004, S. 390)
In vielen empirischen Studien gibt es aber
auch die Tendenz, „subjective reports of expe-
rience“ bewusst zu umgehen und durch objek-
tivere Methoden zu ersetzen wie z.B. (seman-
tisches) Priming oder gleich auf bildgebende
Verfahren auszuweichen. Damit wird zwar der
„subjektive Faktor“ Introspektion vermieden,
aber in Kauf genommen, dass neurowis-
senschaftliche Befunde nicht auf eindeutige
Weise mit entsprechenden Mentalzuständen
korreliert und insofern interpretationsbedürftig
sind (vgl. Ruchsow, Hermle & Kober, 2010).
Insofern scheinen neurowissenschaftliche
Studien häufig zwischen der Skylla unzuver-
lässiger introspektiver Probandenberichte und
der Charybdis objektiver aber uneindeutiger
Messergebnisse wählen zu müssen.
Wie gezeigt, geht der internalistische Fun-
damentalismus davon aus, dass unsere Men-
talzustände wesentlich privat und unmittelbar
zugänglich sind, zwei Annahmen, die in den
nächsten beiden Abschnitten kritisch unter-
sucht werden sollen.
2.6. Privatheit
Wittgensteins Überlegungen zur Privatheit
bzw. zu den Möglichkeiten einer Privat-
sprache in den Paragraphen 243 bis 315
der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ (PU)
lassen sich als kritische Auseinandersetzung
mit dem Cartesianismus lesen. Unter einer
Privatsprache versteht Wittgenstein folgen-
des: „Die Wörter dieser Sprache sollen sich
auf das beziehen, wovon nur der Sprechende
wissen kann; auf seine unmittelbaren, pri-
vaten Empfindungen. Ein Anderer kann diese
Sprache also nicht verstehen.“ (Wittgenstein,
1953/1984, § 243 = PU 243)
Die Grundannahme einer derartigen pri-
vaten Sprache lässt sich folgendermaßen
zusammenfassen.:
P1 „Sensations are private occurences“
(Schroeder, 2001, S. 196). Meine Zahn-
schmerzen sind aus diesem Grund
anderen Personen nicht unmittelbar
zugänglich. Ebenso wenig kann ich mir
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sicher sein, ob eine andere Person ähn-
liche Zahnschmerzen wie ich empfinden
kann.
2.6.1. „Das Rad gehört nicht zur Mas-
chine“ (PU 271)
Aus (P1) ergibt sich eine skeptische Konse-
quenz, die Wittgenstein in PU 272 formuliert:
„Das Wesentliche am privaten Erlebnis ist
eigentlich nicht, dass Jeder sein eigenes Ex-
emplar besitzt, sondern dass keiner weiß, ob
der Andere auch dies hat, oder etwas an-
deres. Es wäre also die Annahme möglich
- obwohl nicht verifizierbar - ein Teil der
Menschheit habe eine Rotempfindung, ein
anderer Teil eine andere.“ Für Wittgenstein
haben private psychische Ereignisse keinerlei
Funktion, vergleichbar einem überflüssigen
Zahnrad in einer Maschine: „Hier möchte ich
sagen: das Rad gehört nicht zur Maschine,
das man drehen kann, ohne dass Anderes
sich mitbewegt“ (PU 271).
Für Wittgenstein sind private mentale
Ereignisse nicht nur überflüssig, sondern
im Rahmen einer öffentlichen Sprache nicht
kommunizierbar. Mentalzustände sind wie
ein Käfer in einer Schachtel, zu der nur der
Besitzer der Schachtel Zugang hat. Der
Käfer ist also wesentlich „privat“. Wittgenstein
analysiert diese Situation folgendermaßen:
„Niemand kann je in die Schachtel des An-
deren schaun; und jeder sagt, er wisse nur
vom Anblick seines Käfers, was ein Käfer
ist. - Da könnte es ja sein, dass Jeder ein
anderes Ding in seiner Schachtel hätte. Ja,
man könnte sich vorstellen, dass sich ein
solches Ding fortwährend veränderte. [...] die
Schachtel könnte auch leer sein“ (PU 293).
Sind Schmerzen, Käfer, etc aber wesentlich
privat, dann ergibt sich als Konsequenz:
„Wenn man die Grammatik des Ausdrucks der
Empfindung nach dem Muster von ’Gegen-
stand und Bezeichnung’ konstruiert, dann
fällt der Gegenstand als irrelevant aus der
Betrachtung heraus“ (PU 293).
2.7. Unmittelbarkeit
Eine ausführliche Kritik an der Vorstellung
unmittelbaren nicht-inferentiellen Wissens
findet sich bereits im 1. Kapitel von Hegels
„Philosophie des Geistes“ (Hegel, 1807/1973,
S. 82 ff.). In der analytischen Philosophie
verlief die Rezeptionsgeschichte Hegels sehr
wechselhaft, um nicht zu sagen: dialektisch.
Nach einer kurzen hegelianischen Phase der
„Gründungsväter“ der analytischen Philoso-
phie, Moore und Russell, verstanden sich
diese als dezidierte Anti-Hegelianer. Dieser
Anti-Hegelianismus im Selbstverständnis der
analytischen Philosophie ging so weit, dass
die oft gestellte Frage, warum sich die an-
alytische Philosophie eigentlich „analytisch“
nenne, folgendermaßen beantwortet werden
sollte: „’analytisch’ bedeutet ursprünglich
genau ’anti-hegelisch’“ (Welsch, 2011, S. 71).
Seit etwa Mitte der 1950er Jahre zeichnet
sich jedoch eine Wiederkehr Hegels im Bere-
ich der neueren analytischen Philosophie ab.
Hier ist (neben John McDowell und Robert
Brandom) insbesondere der amerikanische
Philosoph Wilfrid Sellars zu nennen, der
seine Kritik an der Möglichkeit unmittelbaren
Wissens unter dem Stichwort „Mythos des
Gegebenen“ („myth of the given“) auch als
„Méditations Hegeliènnes“ verstanden wissen
wollte (Sellars, 1956/1997, S. 45).
Nach Sellars lässt sich die Idee, dass „truth
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bearers“ durch „truth makers“ verifiziert (bzw.
falsifiziert) werden, nicht aufrecht erhalten:
„Having a sense-impression is, by itself, an ex-
ample neither of knowledge nor of conscious
experience“ (Sellars, 1956/1997, S. 4), da
es sich bei Sinnesdaten nicht um (proposi-
tionales) und damit wahrheitsfähiges Wissen
handelt. In anderen Worten: „[...] one might
think one is acquainted with certain sorts of
objects (sense data), determinate properties
(this particular shade of yellow), generic uni-
versals (being yellow, being colored), and,
crucially, facts (my being in pain now, some-
thing’s being yellow). None of the items on
this list are the kinds of things that can be true
or false [...]. The object that is yellow, the yel-
lowness of the object, that fact that the object
is yellow are all neither true nor false“ (Fumer-
ton, 2009, Zugriff: 22.01.2012). Der Mythos
des Gegebenen („Myth of the Given“) besteht
nach Sellars in der Idee „that observation [...]
is constituted by certain self-authenticating
nonverbal episodes, the authority of which is
transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal perfor-
mances [...]“ (Sellars 1956/1997, S. 77). Die
Vorstellung einer Fundierung unseres (propo-
sitionalen) Wissens durch mentale Episoden
lässt sich aber nicht halten: „For empirical
knowledge, like its sophisticated extension,
science, is rational, not because it has a
foundation but because it is a self-correcting
enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy,
though not all at once“ (Sellars 1956/1997, S.
79). Bei dem Versuch, Wahrnehmungs-
berichte, also epistemisches bzw. proposi-
tionales Wissen auf nicht-epistemisches bzw.
nicht-propositionales Wissen zu reduzieren,
handelt es sich nach Sellars vielmehr um
einen naturalistischen Fehlschluss: „Now the
idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed
without remainder - even ’in principle’ - into
non-epistemic facts whether phenomenal or
behavioral, public or private [...] is, I believe, a
radical mistake - a mistake of a piece with the
so-called ’naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics“ (Sellars
1956/1997, S. 19).
Aber nicht nur Descartes’ Introspektions-
begriff, sondern auch der diesem zugrunde
liegende Substanzbegriff war sehr umstritten
und wurde von empiristischen Philosophen
wie z.B. John Locke abgelehnt.
3. Locke
3.1. Kritik am Substanzbegriff
Ähnlich wie Descartes wollte auch Locke
einen radikalen Neuanfang in der Philosophie
machen. Er betrachtete sich als Hilfsarbeiter
(„Under-Labourer“), der das Ziel hat, „[...]
clearing Ground a little, and removing some
of the Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowl-
edge [...]“. Durch Leidenschaften, Erziehung,
Gewohnheiten und Vorurteile wird unser Wis-
sen systematisch verzerrt und verfälscht.
Insofern ist auch eine radikale Sprachkritik
erforderlich, denn „Vague and insignificant
Forms of Speech and Abuse of Language
have so long passed for Mysteries of Sci-
ence; And hard or misapply’d Words, with
little or no meaning, have, by Prescription
such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning
and height of Speculation, that it will not be
easy to persuade either those who speak or
those who hear that they are but the Covers
of Ignorance and hindrance of true Knowl-
edge“ (Locke, 1694/1979, S. 10). Das Ziel
dieser Demontage ist die Fundierung unseres
Wissens auf der Grundlage der Erfahrung,
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die nach Locke die einzige Quelle sicherer
menschlicher Erkenntnis ist: „Let us then sup-
pose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper
void of all Characters, without any Ideas. [...]
Whence has it all the materials of Reason and
Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,
From Experience [...]“ (Locke 1694/1979, S.
104). Insofern ist für Locke auch die Frage, ob
es eine cartesianische Seelensubstanz gibt
zu verneinen, da der Begriff „Substanz“ kein
Gegenstand möglicher Erfahrung ist.
Durch die Ablehnung des Substanzbegriffs
ergab sich jedoch eine neue Konstellation
hinsichtlich der Identität von Personen. Für
Descartes war das Problem der diachronen
Identität von eher untergeordneter Bedeutung,
da sein Substanzbegriff die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele (= Persistenz der Person) garantierte.
Die Erklärung der synchronen Identität war
jedoch weitaus problematischer, da sie sich
dem Problem der Interaktion von res extensa
und res cogitans stellen, bzw. den Begriff der
substantiellen Einheit inhaltlich füllen musste.
Für Locke ergab sich eine inverse Prob-
lematik: die synchrone Identität ist leichter zu
denken, während sich die transtemporale Ein-
heit der Person (und damit die Unsterblichkeit
der Seele) ohne Substanzbegriff nur schwer
verstehen lässt.
3.2. Diachrone personale Identität
Locke definiert Person folgendermaßen: „[...]
we must consider what Person stands for;
which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being,
that has reason and reflection, and can con-
sider itself as itself, the same thinking thing,
in different times and places; which it does
only by that consciousness which is insepa-
rable from thinking, and, as it seems to me,
essential to it“ (Locke 1694/1979, S. 335).
„Consciousness“ liefert auch das gesuchte
(naturalistische bzw. neurowissenschaftliche)
Kriterium diachroner Identität: „For, since con-
sciousness always accompanies thinking, and
’tis that which makes every one to be, what
he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself
from all other thinking things, in this alone con-
sists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a
rational Being: And as far as this conscious-
ness can be extended backwards to any past
Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity
of that Person“ (Locke 1694/1979, S. 335). In
der Nachfolge Lockes wurde „consciousness“
meist mit „memory“ bzw. „Erinnerung“ über-
setzt und das Kriterium diachroner Identität
dementsprechend als Erinnerungskriterium
bezeichnet. Für Locke ist wichtig, dass man
sich nicht nur allgemein an eine bestimmte
Wahrnehmungssituation erinnert, sondern
dass die damalige Wahrnehmung sozusagen
„im selben Bewusstsein“ wie die jetzige erfolgt:
„For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat
the Idea of any past Action with the same
consciousness it has of any present Action;
so far it is the same personal self“ (Locke
1694/1979, S. 336).
Locke war der erste, der den Begriff der
Person im Gegensatz zur Scholastik und zum
Cartesianismus allein durch den des Bewusst-
seins bestimmte (Thiel, 1997, S. 163; Gillitzer,
2001, S. 111). Die diachrone Einheit der
Person konstituiert sich im Selbstbewusstsein
und ist damit epistemisch ausschließlich in
der Ersten-Person-Perspektive zugänglich.
Quante nennt dies die „These der erstper-
sönlichen Natur personaler Einheit“ (kurz:
Erstpersönlichkeitsthese; Quante, 2007, S.
57).
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Darüber hinaus vertritt Locke eine „Unab-
hängigkeitsthese“, die besagt, dass person-
ale Einheit „unabhängig von der Identität einer
selbstbewusstseinstranszendenten Substanz“
ist (Quante, 2007, S. 58 f.).. In Lockes Worten:
„For it being the same consciousness that
makes a Man be himself to himself, personal
Identity depends on that only, whether it be an-
nexed only to one individual Substance, or can
be continued in a succession of several Sub-
stances. [...] The same consciousness unit-
ing those distant Actions into the same Person,
whatever Substances contributed to their Pro-
duction“(Locke 1694/1979, S. 336).
Drittens ist Locke der Meinung, dass per-
sonale Einheit ein komplexes Phänomen ist
und sich (z.B. durch das Erinnerungskriterium)
auf informative Weise weiter analysieren lässt.
Quante nennt dies „die These der internen
Komplexität personaler Einheit - kurz: die
Komplexitätsthese“ (Quante, 2007, S. 58).
4. Reid und Butler
Lockes Lösungsansatz wurde insbesondere
von Reid und Butler kritisiert. Reid zeigt
anhand des „Brave Officer Paradox“, dass
Lockes Erinnerungskriterium nicht stichhaltig
ist: „Suppose a brave officer to have been
flogged when a boy at school for robbing an
orchard, to have taken a standard from the
enemy in his first campaign, and to have been
made a general in advanced life; suppose,
also, which must be admitted to be possible,
that, when made a general, he was conscious
of his taking a standard, but had absolutely
lost the consciousness of his flogging“ (Reid,
1785/1975, S. 114). Reids Kritik lässt sich
pointiert folgendermaßen zusammenfassen:
„Identity is transitive; memory continuity is not“
(Olson, 2010, Zugriff: 22.01.2012).
Dieser Transitivitätseinwand lässt sich je-
doch dadurch entkräften, dass man Lockes
Erinnerungsrelation im Sinne einer psychol-
ogischen Verbundenheit („connectedness“)
ersetzt durch die schwächere Relation der
psychologischen Kontinuität („continuity“), für
die gilt: „Zwischen dem Bewusstseinszus-
tand einer Person zum Zeitpunkt t0 und dem
Bewusstseinszustand einer Person zum Zeit-
punkt t1 besteht genau dann psychologische
Kontinuität, wenn es zwischen diesen beiden
Bewusstseinszuständen ein stetiges Band
von Bewusstseinszuständen gibt, die untere-
inander in der Relation der psychologischen
Verbundenheit stehen. Gibt es ein solches
Band, dann handelt es sich bei den beiden
Bewusstseinszuständen zu t0 und t1 um die
Bewusstseinszustände ein und derselben
Person“ (Quante, 2007, S. 47).
Butler wies darauf hin, dass Erinnerungen
stets eine Person implizieren, die die Erin-
nerungen hat. Das Erinnerungskriterium setzt
also personale Identität voraus und kann diese
niemals konstituieren: „And one should re-
ally think it self-evident, that consciousess of
personal identity presupposes, and therefore
cannot constitute, personal identity, any more
than knowledge, in any other case , can con-
stitute truth, which it presupposes“ (Butler,
1736/1975, S. 100).
Butlers Zirkularitätseinwand lässt sich durch
die Annahme sogenannter „q-memories“
entkräften, ein Vorschlag, der auf Sydney
Shoemaker zurückgeht. Nach Shoemaker
sind q-memories durch einen fehlenden im-
pliziten Subjektbezug gekennzeichnet, so
dass sie nicht-zirkulär personale Identität kon-
stituieren können: „One way of characterizing
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the difference between quasi-remembering
and remembering is by saying that the former
is subject to a weaker previous awareness
condition than the latter. Whereas someone’s
claim to remember a past event implies that he
himself was aware of the event at the time of
its occurrence, the claim to quasi-remember a
past event implies only that someone or other
was aware of it“ (Shoemaker, 1970/2003,
S. 24). Jedoch muss sich auch ein Vertei-
diger von Lockes Erinnerungskriterium, der
q-memories als basal ansetzt, fragen lassen,
„auf welcher Grundlage er von der Menge der
Quasi-Erinnerungen zu der Menge der Erin-




Quante und Olson plädieren aufgrund der
geschilderten Schwierigkeiten des Erin-
nerungskriterium für ein anderes naturalis-
tisches Kriterium diachroner Identität, das ph-
ysisches Kontinuitätskriterium. Nach Quante
lässt sich Butlers Zirkularitätseinwand effektiv
durch die Annahme aus dem Weg räumen,
„dass der Träger der mentalen Episoden nicht
die Person, sondern ein [...] menschlicher
Organismus ist“ (Quante, 2007, S. 90). Zu
diesem Schluss kommt auch Olson, der für
einen „somatic approach“ bzw. „animalism“
plädiert: „There appears to be a thinking
animal located where you are. It also ap-
pears that you are the thinking thing - the
only one - located there“. Olsons Überlegung
ist auch durch die absurde Konsequenz des
Erinnerungskriteriums motiviert, dass alle
Unterbrechungen des Bewusstseinsstroms
z.B. durch Schlaf, Narkosen, Ohnmachten,
etc. dazu führen „that I have never existed at
any time when I was completely unconscious“
(Olson, 2010, Zugriff: 22.01.2012).
Auch der New Yorker Philosoph Thomas
Nagel definiert personale Identität anhand
des physischen Identitätskriteriums. Die Mini-
malanforderung an ein physikalisches Korrelat
personaler Identität besteht darin, „bearer of
mental states and the cause of their continuity“
zu sein (Nagel, 1986, S. 40). Hypothetisch
nimmt Nagel an, dass am ehesten das intakte
Gehirn diesen Anforderungen Genüge tut. Ein
alternativer Kandidat ist der menschliche Kör-
per, der eng mit den Hirnfunktionen verknüpft
ist, jedoch „[...] the brain is the only part of
me whose destruction I could not possibly
survive. The brain, but not the rest of the
animal, is essential to the self“. Zusammen-
fassend kann (mit milder Übertreibung) gesagt
werden: „ [...] I am my brain [...]“ (Nagel, 1986,
S. 40). Das Gehirn ist die notwendige und
hinreichende Bedingung personaler Identität
(Northoff, 2001, S. 131-132), da es die biol-
ogische Grundlage aller mentalen Vorgänge
wie Erinnerungen aber auch des „Bewusst-
seinsstroms“ ist und somit ein Fortbestehen
der Person nach (Teil-)verlust des Gehirns
unmöglich erscheint.
6. Parfit
Mit Hilfe eines Gedankenexperiments weist
Parfit nach, dass Nagels Slogan „I am my
brain“ nicht ausreicht, um numerische Identität
zu garantieren: „Suppose next that I need
surgery. All of my brain cells have a defect
which, in time, would be fatal. But a surgeon
can replace all these cells. He can insert new
cells that are exact replicas of the existing
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cells except that they have no defect“ (Parfit,
1984, S. 474). Parfit unterscheidet zwei Oper-
ationsprozeduren: In der ersten („Case One“)
werden alle Nervenzellen meines Gehirns
in einer Serie von 100 Operationen schrit-
tweise entfernt und durch neue ersetzt. Bei
der anderen Operationsart („Case Two“) wird
in einem Schritt mein ganzes Gehirn aus-
getauscht. Bei der ersten Operation ist die
Kontinuität meiner Person gegeben, bei der
zweiten jedoch nicht: „ There is a real dif-
ference between these cases. In Case One,
each of the new parts of my brain is for a time
joined to the rest of my brain. This enables
each new part to become part of my brain.
When the first new part is inserted, and joined
to the rest of my brain, it wins the title to be
as much part of my brain as the old parts.
When the second new part is inserted, it too
becomes a part of my brain. This is true of
every new part, because there is a time when
this part is joined to what then counts as the
rest of my brain.
In Case Two, things are different. There are
no times when each part is joined to the rest of
my brain. Because of this, the new parts do not
count as parts of my brain. My brain ceases to
exist“ (Parfit, 1984, S. 474 f.). Die erste Art der
Operation werde ich (als Person) überleben,
die zweite jedoch nicht, obwohl das Endergeb-
nis in beiden Fällen dasselbe ist. Folglich ist
der Slogan „I am my brain“ nicht hinreichend,
um numerische Identität zu gewährleisten.
Zusammenfassend bleibt festzuhalten, dass
weder Descartes’ noch Lockes Ansatz eine
tragfähige Lösung des Problems der per-
sonalen Identität darstellt. Descartes’ Sub-
stanzbegriff lässt sich im Rahmen des zeit-
genössischen naturalistischen Paradigmas
nicht halten. Die Aufgabe des Substanzbe-
griffs führt in der Folgezeit zu einer Ver-
lagerung der Diskussion von der synchronen
zur diachronen Identität. Aber auch die (natu-
ralistischen ) Kriterien der Erinnerung und der
physischen Kontinuität, die im Zusammenhang
der diachronen Identität formuliert wurden,
sind mit einer Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten
belastet.
Im folgenden sollen Überlegungen des
kanadischen Philosophen Charles Taylor zur
narrativen Identität vorgestellt werden, der
sich nicht nur an der analytischen Philosophie,




Taylors Überlegungen zur personalen Identität
knüpfen in vielen Punkten an Wittgenstein an,
mit dem er sich sehr intensiv auseinanderge-
setzt hat (z.B. Taylor, 1972; 1988a; 1995;
2010). Taylor ist jedoch nicht nur einem an-
alytischen Ansatz verpflichtet, sondern steht
u.a. in den Traditionslinien von Hermeneu-
tik, Anthropologie und Deutschem Idealismus
(hier insbesondere Hegel). Von Axel Honneth
wurde er als ein Parteigänger der Hermeneutik
im Felde der analytischen Wissenschaftstheo-
rie bezeichnet (in: Taylor, 1988b, S. 296).
Für Taylor sind Personen wesentlich „self-
interpreting animals“ (Taylor, 1985a, S. 45 ff.)
und „dialogical selves“ (Taylor, 1995, S. 230).
Sie sind also durch ihre Fähigkeit zur Selbstin-
terpretation und zum sprachlich-dialogischen
Austausch mit anderen Menschen gekennze-
ichnet. Ähnlich wie für Wittgenstein ist für Tay-
lor Sprache ein intrinsisch soziales Phänomen:
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„The matter talked about is no longer just
for me or for you, but for us“ (Taylor, 1985a,
S. 260). Insofern verfehlen wir völlig das
Wesentliche, „if we remain with the monolog-
ical model of the subject, and think of all states
of awareness, knowledge, belief, attending to,
as ultimately explicable as states of individu-
als“ (Taylor, 1985a, S. 265).
7.2. Sprache
Ausgehend von dieser sozialen und dialogis-
chen Dimension der Sprache kritisiert Tay-
lor die zeitgenössischen Sprachauffassungen
als naturalistisch, worunter er Theorien ver-
steht, die von einem Beobachter über einen
beobachteten Gegenstand entwickelt werden,
an dem er nicht beteiligt ist.
Taylor stellt dieser naturalistischen eine
romantisch-expressivistische Sprachauffas-
sung gegenüber, die er auch als Herder-
Humboldt-Hamann-Theorie bzw. als „triple-H
theory“ bezeichnet (Taylor, 1985a, S. 256).
Die Expressivität von Sprache verdeutlicht
auch deren dialogischen Charakter, indem sie
eine bestimmte Art der Beziehung zu einem
Gegenüber ausdrückt. Sprechen heißt dann
„to put it ’out there’, to have it out before us, to
be ’up front’ about it“ (Taylor, 1985a, S. 264).
Sprache erzeugt etwas, „what one might call a
public space, or a common vantage point from
which we survey the world together“ (Taylor,
1985a, S. 259). Etwas ausdrücken bedeutet
„to place it in public space, and thus to bring
us together qua participants in a common act
of focussing“ (Taylor, 1985a, S. 260).
7.3. Hermeneutik
Wie Gadamer ist auch Taylor der Auffas-
sung, dass Menschen immer schon in eine
bestimmte Sprachgemeinschaft, bestimmte
Traditionen und ein bestimmtes Verständ-
nis der Welt hineingeboren sind, das die
Basis ihres Verstehens bildet („Geworfen-
heit“ im Sinne Heideggers). Intersubjektivität
geht der Subjektivität voraus, „we are aware
of the world through a ’we’ before we are
through an ’I’“ (Taylor, 1985b, S. 40). Insofern
befindet sich jeder in einem hermeneutis-
chen Zirkel, weil die Interpretationen unserer
Umwelt selbst schon Resultat vorgängiger
Interpretationen sind (Breuer, 2000, S. 23).
Verstehen hat immer den Doppelcharakter
der Teilnahme an einem Sinngeschehen,
das dem Subjekt vorausgeht und sein Be-
greifen ermöglicht und einem Sichverstehen
(Angehrn, 2004, S. 774): Wie ich die Welt
auffasse, ist davon abhängig, wie ich den Sinn
meines Daseins interpretiere, wie umgekehrt
mein Selbstverständnis nicht losgelöst von
meiner Sicht auf die Dinge zustande kommt
bzw. in Honneths Worten: „Soziales Handeln
ist ohne Bezugnahme auf das situationsge-
bundene Selbstverständnis der handelnden
Subjekte gar nicht angemessen aufzufassen;
der Erklärung einer Handlung muss daher ein
hermeneutisches Verstehen der jeder unmit-
telbaren Beobachtung entzogenen Perspek-
tive des Handelnden unbedingt vorhergehen“
(in: Taylor, 1988b, S. 299).“
Taylor unterscheidet dementsprechend zwei
Interpretationsebenen: Auf einer präreflexiven
Ebene ist Personen ein Selbst- und Weltver-
ständnis vorgegeben, das primär und zum
größten Teil implizit und nicht artikuliert ist (vgl.
Rosa, 1998, S. 200). Dem reflexiven Bewusst-
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sein wird diese gesamte erste (präreflexive)
Interpretationsebene dann zum Gegenstand
einer zweiten Interpretationsebene, in der jene
auf ihre Bedeutungen und ihren Sinn befragt
und sprachlich artikuliert wird.
7.4. Moralische Topographien
Ein „selbstinterpretierendes Tier“ zu sein
heißt für Taylor u.a. auch, sich der Frage zu
stellen „Who I desire to be?“ (Rosa, 1998,
S. 98) und sich durch ihre Beantwortung in
einem moralischen Raum zu verorten. Unsere
Identität als Personen wird aus seiner Sicht
entscheidend durch fundamentale Wertungen
mitbestimmt, so dass sich ein unauflöslicher
Zusammenhang von Personalität und der
Konzeption des Guten ergibt.
Taylor unterscheidet (mit zunehmender
Wertigkeit) zwischen „Lebensgütern“ („Life
Goods“), „Hypergütern“ („Hypergoods“) und
„konstitutiven Gütern“ („Constitutive Goods“).
Konstitutive Güter sind Moralquellen, d. h. „it
is a something the love of which empowers
us to do and be good“ (Taylor, 1989, S. 93).
Dabei leistet das konstitutive Gut mehr als nur
die Bestimmung des Inhalts der Moraltheorie.
„Love of it is what empowers us to be good.
And hence also loving it is part of what it
is to be a good human being.“. Moralthe-
orie gebietet also nicht nur, in bestimmter
Weise zu handeln und bestimmte moralische
Eigenschaften an den Tag zu legen, sondern
schreibt auch vor, zu lieben, was gut ist: „To
love the constitutive good [...] is to be strongly
motivated in just that way which is defined
as part of doing the good [...]. That is why
being good involves loving something and not
just doing something“ (Taylor, 1989, S. 533 f.,
Anm. 2).
Lebensgüter sind demgegenüber Ziele,
Prinzipien und Ideale, die Menschen in ihrem
Leben zu verwirklichen suchen, während Hy-
pergüter Leitwerte darstellen, die Kohärenz
und eine einheitliche Orientierung in unser
Leben zu bringen vermögen
7.5. Narrative Identität
Nach Taylor müssen wir das eigene Leben im
Sinne einer narrativen Darstellung begreifen.
Es genügt nicht, dass ein Individuum über eine
identitätsstiftende moralische Landkarte ver-
fügt bzw. sich im moralischen Raum orien-
tiert. Die Ausbildung und der Erhalt person-
aler Identität verlangt vielmehr, dass es in der
Lage ist, „sich auf dieser Landkarte zu posi-
tionieren, d. h. seinen jeweiligen aktuellen Ort
im Hinblick auf die verzeichneten Güter (und
Übel) zu bestimmen sowie einen Sinn für die
Bewegungsrichtung des eigenen Lebens und
Handelns vor dem Hintergrund dieser Güter
zu entwickeln“ (Rosa, 1998, S. 166). Person-
ale Identität hat eine unhintergehbare zeitliche
Struktur, der die narrative Darstellung der eige-
nen Lebensgeschichte am ehesten gerecht
wird. Personsein erschöpft sich nicht in der
Bestimmung dessen, was jemand ist, sondern
umfasst auch immer, was jemand geworden
ist (oder hätte werden können) bzw. was er
in Zukunft werden wird. Der Mensch ist ein
Geschichten erzählendes Wesen: „It has often
been remarked that making sense of one’s life
as a story is also, like orientation to the good,
not an optional extra; that our lives exist also in
this space of questions, which only a coherent
narrative can answer. In order to have a sense
of who we are, we have to have a notion of how
we have become, and of where we are going“
(Taylor, 1989, S. 47).
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Kritisch anzumerken bleibt, dass Narratio-
nen ebenfalls ein intaktes (autobiographis-
ches) Gedächtnis voraussetzen und sich
damit letztendlich als eine Variante des
Erinnerungskriteriums entpuppen. Sie kön-
nen somit kaum die Identität der Person
garantieren, sondern haben diese vielmehr
zur Voraussetzung. Taylors großes Verdi-
enst besteht jedoch darin, auf die soziale
Dimension personaler Identität hingewiesen
zu haben. Sein Ansatz müsste durch Über-
legungen des Sozialkonstruktivismus ergänzt
werden (z.B. Smith, 2010; Bakhurst, 2011),
was jedoch den Rahmen dieser Arbeit spren-
gen würde.
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The influence of expertise on neural pro-
cesses when anticipating action effects
in tennis N. Balser (1), S. Pilgramm (1,2),
M. Bischoff (1,2), B. Lorey (1,2), K. Zentgraf
(3), R. Stark, A (2). M. Williams (4) & J.
Munzert (1) (1) Institut für Sportwissenschaft,
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, D-35394
Gießen, Germany; (2) Bender Institute of Neu-
roimaging, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen,
D-35394 Gießen, Germany; (3) Institut für
Sportwissenschaft, Universität Bern, CH-3012
Bern, Switzerland; (4) Faculty of Health Sci-
ences, University of Sydney, AUS-NSW 2141
Sydney, Australia
It has recently been proposed that the action
observation network (AON) (Zentgraf et al.,
2011) plays an important role in the anticipa-
tion of action effects. The cerebellum could be
particularly crucial for predicting action conse-
quences because of its role in the control of
executed movements (Miall, 2003) and its in-
clusion in the AON (Cross et al., 2009). To in-
vestigate whether expertise in sport influences
the activation of this network during an an-
ticipation task, 16 expert tennis players and
16 novices observed videos of tennis strokes.
While lying in an fMRI scanner, participants
observed videos showing an opponent’s fore-
hand strokes that were occluded at the mo-
ment of ball-racket contact. The participants’
task was to anticipate the direction of the ob-
served strokes without having any information
about the ball flight. This anticipation task was
contrasted with observing a player bouncing a
ball with no need to anticipate. Results showed
a significantly better anticipation performance
in expert tennis players compared to novices,
t(30) = 4.19, p < .001. The functional imaging
data showed enhanced activation in the main
areas of the AON when contrasting the antic-
ipation and nonanticipation tasks. More pre-
cisely, the premotor cortex, the inferior frontal
gyrus, and the superior parietal lobe showed
greater activation when anticipation of stroke
direction was contrasted with mere observa-
tion. Compared with novices, experts showed
greater activation in the cerebellum during the
anticipation condition. An additional covariate
tennis experiencerevealed that the cerebellar
activation in the experts was higher for players
who had longer tennis experience. Our find-
ings support the theory that the AON is used
to anticipate the effects of observed actions
(Zentgraf et al., 2011). The stronger activation
in the cerebellum suggests that experts rely
on internal models when predicting the conse-
quences of an action.
Inhibitory control assessed through simul-
taneous EEG-fMRI imaging: a pilot study
Sarah Baumeister (1), Sarah Hohmann (1),
Isabella Wolf (1), Michael Plichta (2), Stefanie
Rechtsteiner (1), Maria Zangl (5), Matthias
Ruf (3), Christine Niemeyer (4), Peter Kirsch
(4), Herta Flor (5), Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg
(2), Martin Holtmann (1,6), Vasil Kolev (1,7),
Juliana Yordanova (1,7), Tobias Banaschewski
(1), Daniel Brandeis (1,8) (1) Department of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Psy-
chotherapy, CIMH Mannheim; (2) Depart-
ment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, CIMH
Mannheim; (3) Department Neuroimaging,
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CIMH Mannheim; (4) Department of Clinical
Psychology, CIMH Mannheim; (5) Department
of Cognitive and Clinical Neuroscience, CIMH
Mannheim; (6) Child and Adolescent Psychi-
atry, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany; (7)
Institute of Neurobiology, Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria; (8) Department
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University
of Zürich
Inhibitory control shows individual and ge-
netic variation and is impaired in Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Neuro-
feedback is an emerging nonpharmacological
treatment for ADHD (Holtmann et al., 2009),
but how changes in the inhibitory pathway
contribute to the treatment outcome is still un-
clear. Advanced imaging with combined EEG
(electroencephalography) and fMRI (func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging) should
optimally characterize individual variation
and treatment-induced changes of inhibitory
control.
In this pilot study we explored the feasibility
of simultaneous recording of 64 channel EEG
and 3T (Siemens TIM Trio) fMRI to probe con-
flict processing and inhibitory control using a
Flanker/NoGo task (Meyer-Lindenberg et al.,
2006). The task requires a left or right but-
ton press, corresponding to the central arrow,
when flankers are either other arrows or boxes.
The button press has to be inhibited when
flankers are „XX“.
The fMRI analysis (N=23) revealed robust
NoGo vs. Neutral effects, with increased acti-
vation to NoGo stimuli in an inhibitory network
involving bilateral insula and the ACC (p<.05,
FWE corrected). After gradient, ballistocardio-
gram and ICA corrections, the corresponding
EEG analysis (N=17) revealed a significant
(p<.01 at Cz, compared to neutral flankers)
NoGo positivity lasting from about 460 to
660ms. Furthermore, we found a significantly
(p<.05 at Cz) enhanced N2 in the NoGo
compared to the Neutral condition.
Simultaneous EEG-fMRI during a Flanker/NoGo
task showed landmark effects of inhibitory con-
trol in both imaging modalities with a simple
7 min paradigm suitable for adults as well as
ADHD children. In an ongoing study we now
examine whether inhibitory control is impaired
in ADHD compared to control groups, and
improves after neurofeedback training.
Supported by the SFB 636 and NewMeds
projects.
Manipulierte audiovisuelle Pointlight Dis-
plays beeinflussen die Nutzung interner
Modelle zur Prädiktion M. Bischoff (1,2), B.
Lorey (1,2), S. Pilgramm (1,2), K. Zentgraf
(3,2), R. Stark (2), D. Vaitl (2) & J. Munz-
ert (1,2) (1) Institut für Sportwissenschaft,
Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen, D-35394,
Deutschland; (2) Bender Institute of Neu-
roimaging, Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen,
D-35394, Deutschland; (3) Institut für
Sportwissenschaft, Universität Bern, CH-
3012, Schweiz Um Handlungen und Hand-
lungseffekte zu verstehen, werden im Hirn des
Beobachters interne Modelle der Bewegung
mit der wahrgenommenen Bewegung ver-
glichen. Solche Handlungsrepräsentationen
liegen in verschiedenen Sinnesmodalitäten
vor, die Verarbeitung interner Modelle sollte
also durch Manipulation multisensorischer
Wahrnehmung beeinflussbar sein. Wird bei
der visuellen Handlungswahrnehmung zusät-
zliche auditive Information verwendet und wie
wirkt sich widersprüchliche auditive Informa-
tion aus?
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Ein Tischtennis-Spieler, der seinen Gegen-
spieler während dessen Schlagausführung
beobachtet, nutzt auch den Zeitpunkt des
Schläger-Ball-Kontakts zur Einschätzung des
Schlages. Wird die visuelle Bewegungsinfor-
mation reduziert in Form von Pointlight Dis-
plays (PLD) und werden Ball sowie Schläger
dabei ausgeblendet, dann zeigt der Ton den
Schläger-Ball-Kontakt an und vervollständigt
im Vergleich zu einer äquivalenten aber ton-
losen Bewegung das interne Modell.
Sechsundzwanzig Beobachter wurden mit
funktioneller MRT untersucht, während
sie PLDs eines gegnerischen Tischtennis-
Spielers bezüglich der Richtung des resul-
tierenden Ballflugs einschätzten (die Alterna-
tive war „Cross oder Longline“). In den Videos
waren nur die Marker für beide Schultern, den
rechten Ellenbogen und das rechte Handge-
lenk des Spielers zu sehen, sowie zwei statis-
che Markierungen der gegenüberliegenden
Plattenkante. Der Schläger-Ball-Kontakt kon-
nte allein durch ein entsprechendes Tonsignal
markiert werden. Dieser Ton wurde entweder
gar nicht präsentiert, zum Bewegungsbe-
ginn – also offensichtlich zu früh, 120ms vor
dem eigentlichen Zeitpunkt – unmerklich zu
früh – oder zum Zeitpunkt des Schläger-Ball-
Kontakts.
Die Probanden zeigten eine erhöhte Per-
formanz, wenn der Ton zeitlich kongruent
gesetzt war. Region-of-Interest Analysen der
fMRT-Daten ergaben als sensitiv für die Kon-
gruenz multisensorische Integrationsareale im
temporo-okzipitalen Gyrus temporalis medius
und im anterioren intraparietalen Sulcus. Die
Rekrutierung interner Modelle im ventralen
prämotorischen Kortex und Gyrus frontalis
inferior (BA44) zeigte bei kongruenter audiovi-
sueller Stimulation höhere Aktivierung als bei
der unmerklich inkongruenten. Interne Mod-
elle sind also multisensorisch repräsentiert
und als funktionelle Grundlage der Prädiktion
zugänglich für multisensorische Kongruenzef-
fekte.
Functional and clinical abnormalities in
patientes with panic disorder and their
treatment options S. Deppermann (1), S.
Sickinger (1), N. Vennewald (2), A.J. Fallgat-
ter (1), P. Zwanzger (2) & A.-C. Ehlis (1) (1)
MÃ¼nster, (2) TÃ¼bingen
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) has already been suggested as an
alternative treatment method in a variety of
psychological disorders such as major de-
pression. Another frequent disabling disease
is panic disorder (PD). PD is characterized
by the sudden onset of unexpected panic
attacks often resulting in the avoidance of a
multitude of situations (agoraphobia). The
neurobiological correlate of these symptoms
is believed to be a dysfunction of the fear
network including hyperactivity of the amyg-
dala and decreased activity of the prefrontal
cortex. Accordingly, a model of inadequate
top-down governance in anxiety disorders has
been established. Whereas functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) data could
show that cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)
is capable of normalizing both exaggerated
amygdala activity and prefrontal hypofunction,
the effects of rTMS as an additional therapeu-
tic tool have not been investigated much so
far. Even though CBT is an effective treatment
method it has the disadvantage of a delayed
onset of its effect and is not always sufficient
so that additional psychopharmacological
medication might be needed. Therefore the
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aim of this study was to investigate the ap-
plication of sham controlled prefrontal rTMS
during CBT in order to enhance the impact
of the therapy. To quantify and hence being
able to evaluate the effects of rTMS in terms of
helping to normalize the prefrontal hypoactivity
the neuroimaging method functional near in-
frared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was chosen. One
major advantage of this method over fMRI is
its compliance with especially PD patients.
During the NIRS recording patients performed
an emotional (emotional stroop/Westphal
paradigm) as well as a cognitive task (verbal
fluency). The results are not only ground-
breaking regarding the future of the treatment
of PD but also demonstrate the benefits of
fNIRS as an imaging method to assess higher
cortical structures when other methods such
as fMRI are less convenient.
Frontal Midline Theta in Simple Reaction
Time Tasks: Comparing Predictable and
Unpredictable Stimulus Onset M. Doppel-
mayr & E. Weber FB Psychologie, Universität
Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstr 34, 5020 Salzburg,
Österreich
In several types of sport, fast reaction times
are of upmost importance. To gain a better un-
derstanding of the cognitive processes that oc-
cur in the prestimulusinterval of reactions (as
for example the start of a 100m sprint), we in-
vestigated changes of the EEG frontal midline
theta (FmT), which is known to be related to
working memory, action regulation, and sus-
tained attention.
EEG and simple reaction times of 18 voluntary
participants have been recorded during three
different RT- tasks. In all tasks participants
were instructed to react (push a button) as fast
as possible whenever a circle was presented
on a monitor. The interstimulusinterval (ISI) of
the presentation has been set either to 3 sec-
onds, to 6 seconds or varying between 3 and
6 seconds (in 125 msec steps).
As expected the results indicated the fastest
RT for the 3 sec ISI presentation, followed by
the 6 sec ISI. The varying ISI yielded the slow-
est RT. EEG data indicated significant differ-
ences in the timecourse of FmT activity at fron-
tocentral and central locations. While for the
6 second ISI as well as for the varying ISI
FmTremained on a relatively stable level dur-
ing the last second preceding the task, in the
3 sec ISI condition a specific preparation pat-
ternëmerged. In this task FmT increased sig-
nificantly from a very low level to a level ex-
ceeding the FmT activity of the other task con-
ditions. Taken together these data indicate that
the predictability of a stimulus leads to varying
preparatory attentional processes that can be
detected by FmT.
The neuronal basis of the development of
humans into speaking and cultural beings
Duncker, H.-R. Institut für Anatomie und Zellbi-
ologie der Universität Gießen During the phy-
logenetic development of humankind, both the
structures and functions of the human body
were subjected to evolutionarily-driven biolog-
ical modifications. The body has enlarged,
has developed new proportions with respect to
its extremities, and has dramatically increased
functional capabilities. Each successive Homo
species exhibits an enlarged cerebrum, which
has developed as a consequence of new ter-
tiary association areas, which make up 50
By migration out of the tropical rain forest, their
ancestral living area, into the enlarging East
African savannahs, developing humans could
no longer make use of their inherited feed-
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ing manners and behaviour. As such, they
were forced to invent all necessary activities
for their nourishment and defence, including
their social communication in the extended sa-
vannahs. The inventions of single individu-
als were adopted by most members of the
community, including the successful handing
down of these new abilities to descendants.
Through these developments, social commu-
nities drove the formation of cultural communi-
ties, with common use of, and communication
about, these abilities and activities, which are
collected into, and thereby enlarged, their his-
torical development.
All these new capabilities and communication
abilities could not be integrated into the genetic
codes of the developing humans, but could be
stored as memory in the newly-developed ter-
tiary association areas of the cerebrum. For
handing down of these capabilities to descen-
dants, developing humans depended on the
imitation of these activities and actions, by ob-
serving the activities of their parents and other
community members. These imitations, which
are used occasionally by higher apes, were in-
tensively used by developing humans to hand
down abilities to descendants. However, the
results of the first imitations by minors had
to be intensively socially controlled by parents
and other community members, and the devel-
oping minors had to repeat and rehearse the
imitated actions until they mastered the neces-
sary level of precision. These activities were
then neuronally fixed for automatic future ap-
plication. Apart from these activities, a gesticu-
latory communication developed, perhaps out
of gestural pointing at or towards important ob-
jects or events. The gesticulatory communica-
tion incorporated primarily the language char-
acteristic of including the functional meaning of
these objects or events for the communicating
humans, which are represented together with
the objects or events in the cerebral memory
of the persons.
This gesticulatory communication has devel-
oped – very slowly and in a stepwise fashion
– in combination with linguistic sounds. Only
with the appearance of modern humans, with
their ability to produce all vowels, has a full
capacity for spoken communication developed.
By the long phylogeny of mammals in the sub-
terranean or nocturnal habitat, their auditory
systems became the most important sensory
system for social and emotional interaction. In
the language communication of modern hu-
mans, a direct coupling of the brains of inter-
locutors occurs: The speaker’s production of
cortical excitations for pronouncing words and
sentences induces in the brain of the listener
comparable excitations, together with specific
associations. These capabilities of acoustic
communication depend not only on the mutual
understanding of interlocutors, but also one
the handing down of complex thoughts to all
of the members of the community, and to their
minors. All cultural developments of modern
humans depend on these abilities, in particu-
lar, the development the diversity of different
occupations, as well as thinking in highly de-
veloped cultural communities.
Recording of laser evoked potentials dur-
ing preferential stimulation of mechano-
insensitive nociceptors unmasked by pe-
ripheral nerve block M. Dusch (1*), J. van
der Ham (1*), B. Weinkauf (1), J. Benrath (1),
M. Schmelz (1), R. Rukwied (1), M. Ringkamp
(2), R-D. Treede (3), U. Baumgärtner (3) (1)
Dept. of Anaesthesiology, Medical Faculty
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Mannheim, Heidelberg University, Germany;
(2) Dept. of Neurosurgery, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Baltimore, Maryland; (3) Chair of Neu-
rophysiology, Centre for Biomedicine and Med-
ical Technology Mannheim, Medical Faculty
Mannheim, Heidelberg University, Germany
In order to investigate preferentially mechano-
insensitive (MIA) nociceptors in healthy volun-
teers, laser radiant heat stimuli were applied to
the lateral proximal leg after peripheral nerve
block of the lateral femoral cutaneous nerve
(LFCN). Laser-evoked potentials (LEP) were
recorded in healthy volunteers from partially
anesthetized skin areas.
Nerve block of the LFCN was performed in 10
healthy male subjects with Ropivacain 1
In the area of differential sensitivity LEP re-
sponses were delayed compared to unaffected
skin (225 ±10.4 ms (SEM), vs. 185 ±7.8 ms)
and LEP amplitudes were reduced (13.8 ±1.3
µV vs. 25.6 ±1.6 µV). Reaction times of pain
responses to the laser stimuli were increased
(654 ms vs. 406 ms, p<0.01) and pain magni-
tude reduced (1/10 vs. 5/10 NRS; p<0.01).
The increase of LEP latency suggests that
mechano-insensitive heat-sensitive Aδ noci-
ceptors (MIA type II) have a slower conduction
velocity or a higher response latency as
compared to mechano-sensitive Aδ nocicep-
tors (type II MSA). Alternatively, recruitment
of widely branched slowly conducting and
mechano-insensitive branches of Aδ nocicep-
tors can explain our finding. We conclude
that recording of LEP during laser stimulation
of areas with differentially anesthetized skin
is useful to study a mechanically-insensitive,
heat-sensitive subpopulation of Aδ nocicep-
tors.
Alternative approaches in estimating re-
gional individuality indices and reliability
in complex cognition: FMRI and ERP-data
Thorsten Fehr Center for Cognitive Sciences;
University of Bremen
Individual differences, but also the reliability
of psychophysiological measurements are im-
portant upcoming topics in the neurosciences.
Usually, experimental approaches are directed
to reduce information to describe neural cor-
relates of complex mental processes in a
more comprehensible and putatively sufficient
way. However, individual aspects potentially
due to individual learning history and mental
strategy run the risk of being inappropriately
neglected. Furthermore, retest-reliability in
individual physiological parameters has not
been examined in both experimental intra-
and inter-session arrangements. The present
approach utilizes the STROOP-paradigm as
one of the most consistent and reliable experi-
mental procedures in psychological sciences.
Based on previously published data, there was
an adapted form of the STROOP-task applied
in an EEG- and fMRI-study to estimate indi-
vidual intra- and inter-session reliability of be-
havioural and physiological data. Behavioural
data showed the expected interference effect
for incongruent as compared to congruent
and baseline conditions reflected in longer
response times for the incongruent condition.
Different individuality indices on the basis of
Cartesian analytical geometric will be intro-
duced and applied on functional neuroimaging
data. Reliability- and individuality-estimations
of ERP- and fMRI-data will be compared,
illustrated, and critically discussed.
Topographic correlates of semantic prim-
ing differentiate Alzheimer’s and semantic
dementia M. Grieder (1), R.M. Crinelli (2), T.
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Dierks (1), L.-O. Wahlund (2), T. Koenig (1), M.
Wirth (3) (1) Dept. of Psychiatric Neurophys-
iology, University Hospital of Psychiatry, Uni-
versity of Bern, Switzerland; (2) Karolinska In-
stitute, Dept. NVS, Division of Clinical Geri-
atrics, Stockholm, Sweden; (3) Jagustlab, He-
len Willis Neuroscience Institute, University of
California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
With the progressing course of Alzheimer’s
disease (AD), deficits in declarative memory
increasingly restrict the patients’ daily activi-
ties. Besides episodic memory impairments,
semantic memory is affected by this demen-
tia subtype. In contrast, patients suffering from
semantic dementia (SD) show isolated seman-
tic memory impairments. With the aim to es-
tablish sensitive biological markers for the dif-
ferentiation of symptom dimensions in demen-
tia subtypes, the present study compared AD
and SD patients with healthy controls. In par-
ticular, the automatic and controlled seman-
tic word processing was investigated by com-
bining the recording of event related poten-
tials (ERP) with the performance of a seman-
tic priming (SP) task. Concretely, the task re-
quired word/non-word (prime and target) lexi-
cal decisions on sequentially presented word
pairs, consisting of semantically related or un-
related prime-target combinations. Besides
the analysis of the target onset reaction times
(RT), early automatic and later controlled ERP
components were investigated. Both patient
groups showed general slowed RTs for all
task conditions (related and unrelated word
pairs), whereby the SD performed consider-
able slower than the AD. However, the size
of the SP effect was comparable in all partic-
ipant groups. The ERP results indicate that
early automatic components are only slightly
altered in AD and SD patients whereas the
late controlled components are affected most
dominantly in the SD group. Taken together,
these results could reflect that the semantic
database itself is likely to remain preserved in
AD and to a less extent also in SD patients,
who suffer from deteriorated retrieval of se-
mantic representations. Taken together, the
automatic spread of activation in the semantic
network appeared to be preserved in both pa-
tient groups, while the late ERP components
gave a clear indication of neurophysiological
alterations in AD and SD. Together with subse-
quent studies, these novel findings might im-
prove a profound understanding of the demen-
tia subtypes and their early detection.
EEG recorded during gross-motor behav-
ior and sleep Hoedlmoser, K. (1), Birklbauer,
J. (2), Rigler, S. (1), Mueller, E. (2), & Sch-
abus, M. (1) (1) Laboratory for Sleep and Con-
sciousness Research, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Salzburg, Austria; (2) De-
partment of Sport Science and Kinesiology,
University of Salzburg, Austria
There is now compelling evidence that sleep
contributes to the consolidation of procedural
types of memory and to motor learning in par-
ticular. Concerning offline processing of fine-
motor skills during sleep there is already pro-
found knowledge. However, data on gross-
motor tasks are still missing. Therefore, the
aim of our study was to investigate sleep ef-
fects on performance in a real-life gross-motor
task: riding an inverse steering bicycle. We
tested 20 healthy male subjects (20 - 29 yrs;
M=24.3, SD=2.03) by a between-subject de-
sign. Each subject either participated in a 2hr
midday nap or a restful wake condition. In both
conditions participants were previously trained
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on the gross-motor learning task and tested for
performance pre- and post-sleeping/resting.
Gross-motor performance was decreased af-
ter nap but not after resting wakefulness. Fast
sleep spindle density (13-15Hz) was nega-
tively related to the change of performance
over nap, whereas slow sleep spindle density
(11-13Hz) was generally (baseline and exper-
imental nap) negatively related to initial gross-
motor performance. Together these findings
suggest that fast sleep spindles during short
midday naps interfere with gross-motor con-
solidation and individual’s general gross mo-
tor learning ability is reflected in interindividual
differences of slow sleep spindle activity. Ad-
ditionally to our sleep-related hypotheses, we
investigated EEG alpha activity during riding
the inverse in comparison to a normal steer-
ing bicycle in a subsample of our subjects
(N=5). These analyses revealed a strong task
related alpha synchronization more prominent
during inverse compared to normal steering bi-
cycling. As the inverse steering bicycle pro-
vides an inversion-evoked cognitive load due
to inhibition of highly automated movement
patterns (riding a normal steering bicycle), the
observed task related power increase in the al-
pha band with respect to a reference can be
considered as a cortical correlate of the inhibi-
tion of already well known, automated memory
traces.
Recording EEG and fMRI simultaneously
during a reward anticipation task: Pilot re-
sults for a study with ADHD children Sarah
Hohmann (1), Michael Plichta (2), Isabella
Wolf (1,3), Stefanie Rechtsteiner (1), Sarah
Baumeister (1), Maria Zangl (5), Christine
Niemeyer (4), Matthias Ruf (3), Peter Kirsch
(4), Herta Flor (5), Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg
(2), Tobias Banaschewski (1), Martin Holt-
mann (1,6), Daniel Brandeis (1,7) (1) De-
partment of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
and Psychotherapy, Central Institute of Men-
tal Health; (2) Department of Psychiatry and
Psychotherapy, CIMH; (3) Department Neu-
roimaging, CIMH; (4) Department of Clinical
Psychology, CIMH; (5) Department of Cog-
nitive and Clinical Neuroscience, CIMH; (6)
Department of Child and Adolescent Psychia-
try – University of Bochum; (7) Department of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry - University
of Zürich
Recording EEG during an fMRI - session is
increasingly used to study cognitive and mo-
tivational states in basic and clinical neuro-
science. We used this combined measure-
ment technique to learn more about the hu-
man reward system. Simultaneous recordings
require modifications of the original fMRI re-
ward task to improve signal to noise ratio for
EEG. One aim of the present study was thus
to find out whether the fMRI core results would
prove robust in the modified paradigm, while
resolving potential technical problems which
may occur when combining both methods in
challenging motivational paradigms. Based on
previous work of Kirsch et al. (2003) we modi-
fied a reward anticipation task for the use with
EEG, which is known to reliably activate ventral
striatal brain structures. EEG data and fMRI
images were simultaneously acquired in a 3T
MRI Siemens TIM Trio scanner from 20 healthy
participants (20 to 26 years) using an event re-
lated design. Money gained of the reward task
was paid after the fMRI-Session.
We found a stronger BOLD signal in the ven-
tral striatum during anticipation of reward. The
robust activation of the brain reward system in
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our modified monetary incentive task confirms
that neither simultaneous fMRI-EEG, nor the
corresponding task modifications diminished
sensitivity in detecting ventral striatal BOLD-
responses. The analyses revealed meaning-
ful ERPs with significant differences between
both conditions (win money/no money) devel-
oping during early (<1s) as well as late (>1s)
stages of reward anticipation.
Showing that simultaneous combination of
both methods produced good data quality
concerning electrophysiology and hemody-
namic response future work will concentrate
on data fusion of both techniques to fully uti-
lize the complementary information brought by
EEG to fMRI and vice versa. In future studies
with ADHD-children we will apply this task to
study effects of neurofeedback-training on the
brain reward system regarding neurobiological
and neurophysiological alterations.
Acute and chronic response of electroen-
cephalographic activity to exercise during
normoxia and normobaric hypoxia: a pi-
lot study Hülsdünker, T. (1), Gutmann, B. (1),
Mierau, A. (1), Mierau, J. (1), Hollmann, W.
(2), Strüder, H.K.(1) (1): Institute of Movement
and Neurosciences, German Sport University
(Cologne, Germany), (2): Institute for Cardiol-
ogy and Sports Medicine, German Sport Uni-
versity (Cologne, Germany)
It has been suggested, that exercise train-
ing under normobaric hypoxia may be supe-
rior to normoxic training for the performance
of endurance athletes. So far, most of the
previous research has focused on vascular,
metabolic and muscular changes associated
with exercising under hypoxia without taking
into account that changes may also occur in
the central nervous system. Therefore, the
aim of the current study was to examine the
effects of acute exercise before and after train-
ing under normoxic versus hypoxic conditions
on Electroencephalography (EEG). Three en-
durance untrained male volunteers performed
one-legged cycle training for 30 minutes, three
times per week, for four weeks. One leg was
trained under normoxic and the other leg under
normobaric hypoxic (12.5Before training, up-
per alpha power increased by after normoxic
but decreased by after hypoxic exercise in the
parietal region. These changes were attenu-
ated after training in normoxia but even more
pronounced after training in hypoxia. Our re-
sults suggest that exercise effects on EEG
are strongly influenced by hypoxia. Training-
induced adaptations to normoxic versus hy-
poxic exercise may have opposite directions
however, with the same meaning (here: in-
creased activity in the parietal cortex).
Do lateralized readiness potentials help to
elucidate extraversion-related differences
in the magnitude of the psychological re-
fractory period (PRP) effect? Rebekka In-
dermühle, Stefan Troche, and Thomas Ramm-
sayer Department of Psychology, University of
Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Psychological refractory period (PRP) refers
to a major bottleneck of information process-
ing that becomes evident when participants
are required to respond to two signals (S1
and S2) presented in rapid succession. Typi-
cally, the response to S2 becomes increasingly
delayed with decreasing stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) between S1 and S2. The ma-
jor goal of the present study was to answer
the question of whether extraversion-related
individual differences can be identified at this
stage of premotor information processing. For
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this purpose, 63 introverts and 63 extraverts
performed a PRP task and stimulus-locked
(S-LRP) and response-locked (LRP-R) lateral-
ized readiness potential latencies were deter-
mined. To quantify the PRP effect at the be-
havioral level, regression analyses were per-
formed separately for each participant with
SOA as independent variable and response
time to S2 as dependent variable. Thus, the
resulting regression coefficient b represents
an estimate of the magnitude of the individ-
ual PRP effect. While at the behavioral level,
a reliably more pronounced PRP effect could
be confirmed for introverts compared to ex-
traverts, extraversion-related individual differ-
ences could be revealed neither for S-LRP nor
for LRP-R latencies. Our findings suggest that
experimentally induced overload of the infor-
mation processing system by means of a PRP
task appears to differentially affect introverts
and extraverts. LRP analyses, however, did
not prove to be sensitive for the identification
of these behavioral differences at the electro-
physiological level.
This work was supported by the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation (105314-120096).
Enhancement of delta- and theta EEG
power during perception of visual ambigu-
ous stimuli. Ksenia Khalaidovski, Christina
Schmiedt-Fehr, Canan Basar-Eroglu & Birgit
Mathes. Institute of Psychology and Cognition
Research, University of Bremen, Grazer Str.4,
D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Ambiguous patterns make up a well-known
class of visual phenomena in which one in-
variant stimulus pattern is perceived in two
different, mutually exclusive ways. When sub-
jects indicate a perceptual reversal by pressing
a button a reversal-related slow positive wave,
which is prominent in the delta-band (0.5-3
Hz), can be detected [1]. This delta compo-
nent, by its functional and topographical simi-
larity to the P300, was interpreted as reflecting
the conscious recognition of the perceptual
change. However, focused attention needed
during perceptual reversals should also reflect
in an enhanced theta (4-7 Hz) response. This
EEG study aimed to investigate the reversal-
related delta and theta activity using the stro-
boscopic alternative motion (SAM) paradigm,
a multistable stimulus that during constant
viewing induces internally generated changes
in the perceived direction of motion of flashed
dots. Reaction times from an unambiguous
control condition were used to estimate the
stimulus onset after which the percept has
presumably changed. Reversal-related delta
as well as theta EEG power was enhanced
when compared to a time period during which
the percept was stable. As expected, the
theta response exhibited a frontal maximum.
Further, the topography of the theta response
observed following exogenously triggered
perceptual reversals differed from internally
generated perceptual changes. These results
suggest that the state of enhanced attention
may be reflected by reversal-related activity in
the delta and theta band. These emphasize
the influence of top-down regulated processes
upon multistable perception [2]. [1] C. Basar-
Eroglu et al. (1993), Int J Neurosci 73, 139-51
[2] B. Mathes et al. (2006), Neurosci Lett 402,
145-49
EEG-Analysis with Matrix-Wavelets A. Klein
Physiologisches Institut, Aulweg 129, 35392
Gießen
Scalar wavelet analysis of EEG-recordings
poses a considerable problem due to the
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amount of data produced. In particular, the
resulting wavelet transforms are not obviously
related to each other, and it would be very
desirable if known or suspected relationships
between channels could be modelled within
the transform itself, not necessitating any ad-
ditional steps. This requirement is met by the
Matrix-Wavelet-Transform which operates on
vector-valued instead of scalar-valued signals
using matrix-valued wavelet functions, and
which guarantees that any information con-
tained in the original signal is still available for
analysis in the computed transform.
The possibilities of this novel method, for ex-
ample the analysis of centroids of activity, di-
mensionality of the signal, and time-frequency
centroids, are presented and compared with
results that were obtained with more traditional
methods.
Neuronal correlates of focused attention
in pistol shooting sports Christoph Krein-
bucher, Andrea Geipel, Denise Beckmann-
Waldenmayer & Jürgen Beckmann Institute
of Sport Psychology, Technische Universität
München
In shooting sports the last few seconds of the
shot preparation are crucial for a successful
shot outcome. It is not yet clear if certain fre-
quencies in different regions of the brain are
mandatory for achieving peak performance.
Therefore, neuronal correlates of focused at-
tention in sport pistol shooting ought to be re-
searched further. Moreover, the investigation
should reveal whether an increase in focused
attention can be achieved through the imple-
mentation of sport specific attentional training
and if there are also changes related to the
cortical activity.
The participants included thirteen male and
seven female right handed youth athletes (M
= 16.79, SD = 2.68) from the German shoot-
ing federation (DSB). While the experimen-
tal group (N = 11) received attentional train-
ing based on scientifically substantiated re-
search and augmented by hypnotherapeutic
elements, participants in the control group (N
= 9) engaged in progressive muscle relaxation.
Both cohorts received six 90 minute training
sessions. A 64-channel EEG was used be-
fore and after the trainings were conducted to
evaluate the efficacy of the attention training
measures. In each of them a competition was
designed in which the pistol shooters were re-
quired to shoot 60 shots on a target in 90 min-
utes. The shot release was determined with
the help of an optical sensor fixed directly on
the weapon. The sensor’s analyzing software
enabled the differentiation between good and
bad shots based on an assessment of sev-
eral shooting relevant criteria during the aiming
process. In addition to also assessing the par-
ticipant’s overall shot outcome, an assessment
of the athlete’s distractibility from the shoot-
ing tasks was conducted by evaluating the ath-
lete’s perception of subliminal stimuli. Self-
report questionnaires were also used to evalu-
ate the participant’s level of attention.
Results from baseline measures of the brain
waves revealed that an increase of theta ac-
tivity in frontal areas is only present in bad
shots. Thus, there is evidently an optimal level
of the theta frequency range. In good shots,
there is a higher alpha activity in parietal re-
gions two seconds before shot release than in
bad shots. These findings indicate an inhibi-
tion of verbal and analytical processes while
trying to become highly focused before pulling
the trigger. Further calculations are needed to
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assess the degree to which a change in brain
activity occurs through the implementation of
the attention training and how this correlates
with behavioral states.
Change detection enhances the P3 and
fronto-parietal delta response during delay-
dependent working memory B. Mathes (1,2),
J. Schmiedt (1), C. Schmiedt-Fehr (1,2), C.
Pantelis (3) & C. Basar-Eroglu (1,2) (1) Uni-
versity of Bremen, Institute of Psychology and
Cognition Research, Bremen, Germany, (2)
Centre for Cognitive Science, Germany (3)
Melbourne Neuropsychiatry Centre, University
of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Both, recognition of previously encoded stim-
uli and change detection enhance the P3. The
current study contrasted these opposite influ-
ences on the P3 using a delayed matching-to-
sample task, which included requirements of
commonly used working memory as well as
change detection tasks. Mean P3 amplitude
and delta activity was analysed from partic-
ipants who classified probe stimuli as either
being identical or modified. The P3 ampli-
tudes were larger for modified than for identi-
cal probes, with both eliciting a larger P3 than
during encoding. Enhanced single-trial ampli-
tude and trial-by-trial consistency of delta ac-
tivity contributed to the larger P3 for the mod-
ified probe. Fronto-parietal phase coherence
of delta activity was also more enhanced for
modified than for identical probes. The results
indicate that the P3 reflects an adaptable pro-
cess of attentional resource allocation to opti-
mize memory-guided decision-making.
Brain oscillatory changes after acute ex-
ercise in pre-school children during eyes-
closed versus eyes-open resting condi-
tions Mierau, A. (1), Hülsdünker, T. (1),
Mierau, J. (1), Hense, A. (2), Hense, J. (2),
Strüder, H.K. (1) (1) Institute of Movement
and Neurosciences, German Sport Univer-
sity (Cologne, Germany); (2) Children’s Sport
School NRW (Cologne, Germany)
The effects of acute exercise on brain corti-
cal activity have been reported in some pre-
vious studies however, only for adults. To
the best of our knowledge, there have been
no studies which investigate such effects in
pre-school children although this age-group
is characterized by a particularly high plas-
ticity of the central nervous system. 8 male,
pre-school children participated in the study
(5.6±0.5 yrs; 122.4±4.2 cm; 22.1±2.7 kg). In
a balanced cross over design participants ei-
ther completed an exercise session (EXE) of
45 min or a control condition (CON) where
they were allowed to paint and/or to talk to
their parents. The exercise session consisted
in three out of five different movement games
(10 min each) that were introduced in a coun-
terbalanced order and a soccer match (15
min) at the end of the session. Heart rate
(HR) was recorded continuously before, dur-
ing and after exercise as a measure of physi-
cal demand. 15-20 min before (PRE) and af-
ter (POST) one minute resting EEG record-
ings were completed with the eyes closed
and the eyes open in a counterbalanced or-
der between subjects. EEG data was Fourier
transformed to provide estimates for abso-
lute power in eight frequency bands (delta to
gamma) based on the individual peak alpha
frequency and analyzed in four regions across
the scalp. Average HR during the exercise ses-
sion was 150.2±15.8 beats/min. Lower-1 al-
pha power was reduced for CON compared to
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EXE (p<0.05) in the eyes open condition. Fur-
thermore, beta1 and beta2 power were signifi-
cantly lower in the frontal cortex for EXE com-
pared to CON (p<0.001). The results of the
present study show that acute exercise can in-
duce significant changes in brain cortical ac-
tivity of 5-year old children. These changes
are characterized by decreased frontal activ-
ity accompanied by a reduction of global corti-
cal arousal however, only when visual input is
present.
Statistical methods for the identification of
significant directed interactions between
EEG signals T. Milde, K. Schwab, L. Leistritz
& H. Witte Institut für Medizinische Statistik, In-
formatik und Dokumentation
The Granger Causality Index (GCI) and Par-
tial Directed Coherence (PDC) are two of the
most common methods for the identification of
directed interactions between EEG signals. To
identify statistically significant interactions it is
necessary to know the probability distributions
of these interaction measures under the null-
hypothesis of absent interactions. As desired
distributions are mostly unknown nonparamet-
ric statistical methodologies must be used to
identify significant interactions. Fundamentals
of GCI- and PDC-analysis are presented us-
ing multivariate AR-models. Statistical analy-
sis of resulting values via bootstrapping in the
multi-trial case and via surrogate data is pre-
sented. The focus is on the comparison be-
tween different groups and tasks. It can be
shown that topographic representations of sig-
nificant directed interactions allow conclusions
on interacting brain regions. Benefits of these
techniques are demonstrated for applications
in pain research and in clinical child psychol-
ogy.
Supported by the German Federal Research
Council, Wi 1166/10-2.
Bimodal processing of audio-visual stim-
uli during face-to-face communication
Horst M. Müller, Verena Winter, Hendrik
Wesselmeier SFB 673 „Alignment in Commu-
nication“ and EC 277 „Cognitive Interaction
Technology“ (CITEC), University of Bielefeld,
33501 Bielefeld, Germany
While speaking in a face-to-face dialogue, lip
reading supports the language comprehension
process substantially. Besides this bimodal
binding process during natural language com-
prehension, perception of voice and lip move-
ment of the interlocutor is not synchronic. In a
conversation, for instance standing two metres
apart from each other, an approx. 6 ms delay
of the voice exists. Due to this fact, auditory
sensation after visual sensation is a common
circumstance, but auditory sensation before vi-
sual sensation should be unusual to us. How-
ever, in comparison to hearing only, an audio-
visual signal should have the most ecological
validity. In this study, we investigated 1) how
varying the temporal synchronity of the audi-
tory signal to the visual signal evokes different
ERP wave forms and 2) how bimodal audio-
visual processing will influence the amplitude
of the N1/P2 component. Therefore, 25 sub-
jects perceived audio-visual sequences of up
to four seconds in length. The auditory signal
laged for 0 ms, 40 ms, 80 ms, 200 ms, 360 ms
and preceded 40 ms, 80 ms, 120 ms and 280
ms in relation to the visual signal while record-
ing the EEG. In addition, the bimodal effects
were measured against a physical deviance
of the stimuli as an additional control condi-
tion. In a behavioral task the naturalness of
the stimuli was rated by a questionnaire and
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compared to ERPs. The auditory after visual
sensation caused flattened N1/P2 amplitudes
while the odd situation with auditory before vi-
sual sensation caused N1/P2 amplitudes sim-
ilar to natural synchronic stimuli. The results
correlate with the findings from the behavioral
experiment where subjects had to judge when
an audio-visually presented stimulus was out
of sync. These findings were discussed in
the framework of the lip-moving requirements
of speaking humanoid robots, which could in-
crease the robustness of the machine to hu-
man communication.
Supported by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (SFB 673, EC 277)
The Applicability of the Somatotopic Prin-
ciple to Action Execution, Imagery, and Ob-
servation T. Naumann (1), B. Lorey (1,2), S.
Pilgramm (1,2), C. Petermann (4), M. Bischoff
(1,2), K. Zentgraf (3,2), R. Stark (2), D. Vaitl
(2) & J. Munzert (1) (1) Institute for Sports
Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen, D-
35394, Germany; (2) Bender Institute of Neu-
roimaging, Justus Liebig University Giessen,
D-35394, Germany; (3) Institute for Sports Sci-
ence, University of Bern, CH-3012, Switzer-
land; (4) Department of Sports Medicine, Jus-
tus Liebig University Giessen, D-35394, Ger-
many
Jeannerod’s (2001) mental simulation theory
hypothesizes overlapping cerebral activation
during the imagery, observation, and execution
of human movements. Several fMRI studies
have shown somatotopic activation patterns
for the imagery (Ehrsson et al., 2003) and
observation (Wheaton et al., 2004) of move-
ments with different effectors that are roughly
similar to the patterns found for their execu-
tion. Against this background, the goal of
the first study was to compare the degree of
overlap between both simulation states and
execution in one design. During fMRI mea-
surement, participants had to imagine, ob-
serve, and execute alternate, unilateral exten-
sion/flexion movements with the right hand,
right foot, or both effectors simultaneously.
The fMRI results showed similarities between
execution and imagery in both the activation
pattern and the dissociation of effectors in
the contralateral motor cortex (M1, PMC &
SMA). Although these areas were activated
significantly during observation, this condition
showed more of an overlap of both effectors. A
somatotopic dissociation was found only in the
right (ipsilateral) hemisphere (BA44). To inves-
tigate the relevance of somatotopy and move-
ment characteristics for the degree of overlap,
the second study extended the design to in-
clude two additional movements. This time,
participants had to imagine or observe three
different unilateral movements executed with
either the right hand or the right foot. The first
movement was the rhythmic extension/flexion
movement already described, the second was
an accuracy-demanding pointing task, and in
the third task, subjects had to generate static
force by pushing a bellows. Results showed
distinct activation sites in the contralateral mo-
tor cortex for different movements during ac-
tion observation. No clear somatotopic orga-
nization could be found for either hand or foot
movements. It is concluded that there might
be a task-specific form of organization in ac-
tion observation (Graziano, 2006), whereas an
effector-specific dissociation of different types
of movements is found for imagery.
Ehrsson, H. H. et al. (2003). Journal of Neu-
rophysiology, 90, 3304-3316. Graziano, M.
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(2006). Annual Review of Neuroscience, 29,
105-34 Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neuroimage,
14, 103-109. Wheaton, K. J., et al. (2004).
Neuroimage, 22, 277-288.
Mismatch Negativity in Patients with Ma-
jor Depression Christine Norra (1), Sebas-
tian Waniek (2) (1) Dept. of Psychiatry, Psy-
chotherapy, Preventive Medicine, Ruhr Univer-
sity Bochum, (2) Dept. of Psychiatry and Psy-
chotherapy, University Hospital Münster, Ger-
many
Mismatch negativity (MMN) is an auditory
evoked potential that has consistently detected
neural pre-attentive information processing
deficits of rare unexpected deviants mainly
in schizophrenia. Neurochemically the gluta-
matergic neurotransmitter system has been
identified as crucial for the origin of deficits
in MMN. There is also some evidence for
monoaminergic modulation of MMN. Still, with
regard to patients with depressive disorders
there are only a few small and rather hetero-
geneous studies of MMN, so far. The aim
of the study was first a comparison of MMN
between patients with major depression and a
healthy control group, and second, a longitudi-
nal examination of differential monoaminergic
medication effects on MMN.
Auditory MMN was recorded using multi-
channel EEG in 17 unmedicated inpatients
with an acute depressive episode and age-
matched healthy controls. Patients received
a follow-up MMN after four weeks of random-
ized antidepressant treatment with selective
serotonergic or noradrenergic re-uptake in-
hibitors. In parallel, depressed symptoms
were documented on a weekly basis.
MMN amplitudes of scalp derived potentials
were impaired, with different alterations in the
latencies pointing to deficits of MMN gener-
ation in depressed patients as opposed to
healthy controls. Brain source analysis sig-
nificantly located the largest MMN impairment
in patients left frontally with increased latency.
However, despite full psychopathological re-
sponse patients showed no significant change
of MMN after antidepressive pharmacother-
apy, irrespective of the selective nature of the
monoaminergic drug.
Our findings point to deficits of the auditory in-
formation processing in MMN in patients with
depressive disorder, too. However, the ab-
sence of any normalization of the MMN in the
post-acute phase regardless of the pharma-
cological profile of monoaminergic antidepres-
sants might rather refer to the trait character
of underlying pathophysiological mechanisms
in depression. Further longitudinal studies are
warranted to investigate the potential seroton-
ergic modulation of MMN and its clinical im-
pact.
Personal Identity from the Viewpoint of
Neuroscience and (Analytical) Philosophy
M. Ruchsow Christophsbad, Faurndauer Str.
6-28, 73035 Göppingen
During the last years the controversy about di-
achronic personal identity was dominated by
naturalistic approaches, proposing a (modi-
fied) memory criterion (e.g. Locke), a physi-
cal criterion of bodily continuity (e.g. Williams,
Nagel), or a combination of both (e.g. Brand,
Northoff). Contrary to this, Wittgenstein’s non-
naturalistic approach shows that the meaning
of a word is its use in language (Philosophi-
cal Investigations [PI] § 43). With reference
to (diachronic) personal identity Wittgenstein
succinctly remarks that „there is a great variety
of criteria for personal ’identity’“ (PI 404) which
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can be characterized by family resemblance
(PI 66). A detailed elaboration of Wittgen-
stein’s basic idea can be found in the work
of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor
who advocates that personal identity nowa-
days is influenced by three traditions: 1.) a
disengaged atomistic individualism originating
mainly from the philosophy of Enlightenment,
2.) a romantic expressivism as alternative to
Enlightenment philosophy, and 3.) a traditional
theistic position. Taylor refuses disengaged
atomism. In his view persons obtain identity
by identification with their social institutions /
social roles, which alludes to Hegel’s concept
of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and I. Berlin’s con-
cept of positive freedom. The present paper
argues for a view of personality in the tradi-
tion of hermeneutics and (post)analytical phi-
losophy and refuses naturalistic and neurosci-
entific solutions to the problem of diachronic
personal identity.
Wavelets - what works and what doesn’t? T.
Sauer Lehrstuhl für Numerische Mathematik,
Heinrich-Buff-Ring 44, 35392 Gießen, Ger-
many
Wavelets are an extremely powerful tool to pro-
cess phenomena that are local in time and fre-
quency. Such effects appear frequently espe-
cially in the context of EEG signals. Due to
this reason, wavelet methods, discrete ones as
well as continuous ones, can be found in more
and more toolboxes for biosignal processing.
In practice, however, it happens quite often
that a transform is applied to a class of sig-
nals for which it is neither intended nor suit-
able. This can lead to very strange results and
the reasons for that are of principal nature, not
even due to incorrect or poor implementations.
In this talk I will mention and explain some
of these phenomena (which, by the way, can
even appear in a similar way for the Fourier
transform); since they cannot be avoided in
general, it is a good idea to be at least aware
of their existence.
Cortical current density oscillations in the
motor cortex are correlated with muscu-
lar activity during (sub-)maximal bike exer-
cise Stefan Schneider (1), David Rouffet (2),
Francois Billaut (2), Heiko K. Strüder (1) (1)
German Sport University Cologne, Institute of
Movement and Neurosciences, Germany; (2)
Victoria University Melbourne, School of Sport
and Exercise Science, Australia
Despite modern imaging techniques, assess-
ing and localizing changes in brain activity dur-
ing whole body moderate and intensive ex-
ercise is still challenging and has not been
shown so far. Using an active EEG system
in combinations with source localization algo-
rithms, in this study we aimed to asses, dis-
play and localize changes in brain cortical ac-
tivity at different intensities of bike exercise.
Two experienced bikers (one male / one fe-
male) served as subjects in this study. EEG
activity was recorded on 32 sites across the
motor cortex (m1). Simultaneously muscle ac-
tivity was recorded using EMG. Muscular as
well as brain activity were time locked to the
pedaling cycle. Averaging 100 cycles at differ-
ent Watt loads up tp 7W/kg body weight, re-
vealed a high correlation between oscillations
in muscular activity and cortical current den-
sity (CCD) in the lower limbs motor cortex area
(MNI 0/-40/60). Results demonstrate that it
is possible to assess and localize brain corti-
cal activity even during maximal exercise inten-
sity using highly sophisticated but also easy to
use and simple techniques like EEG in com-
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bination with source localization algorithms.
Furthermore results confirmed the assumption
that increasing exercise intensity is accompa-
nied by an increase in cortical current density
in M1, whereas activity patterns remain com-
paratively stable across different exercise in-
tensities.
Multimodal imaging of complex language
processing - A combined NIRS-EEG study
S. Schneider (1), L. Wagels (2), A-C. Ehlis (1),
L. Ernst, A.J. Fallgatter (1), A. M. Rapp (1) (1)
Clinic of Psychiatry und Psychotherapy, Uni-
versity of Tuebingen, 72076 Tuebingen, Ger-
many; (2) Department of Clinical Psychology
and Psychotherapy, University of Tuebingen,
72072 Tuebingen, Germany
Modern neuroimaging methods allow for a
distinct visualization of the localization, func-
tion and intercommunication of the language
network. The deliberate, combined application
of different imaging methods, in particular,
can benefit a holistic investigation of dynamic
processes, on the one hand, and brain regions
and networks, on the other, that are crucially
involved in language processing. The present
study focuses on simultaneous recordings
of electroencephalography (EEG) and near-
infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) to investigate
both temporal as well as topographical as-
pects of brain activation patterns associated
with the processing of complex language, such
as metaphorical speech or coherent discourse.
A group of 20 right-handed, healthy subjects
performed two subsequent tasks while EEG
and NIRS data were recorded simultaneously:
First, participants had to judge the mean-
ingfulness of metaphoric, literal or nonsense
phrases. In the second paradigm short stories
were presented in form of sentences with ei-
ther definite articles (leading to more coherent
discourse) or indefinite articles (leading to less
coherent discourse) as well as a sequence of
meaningless letter combinations as a control
condition. Neurophysiological data revealed
condition related differences in brain activa-
tion patterns for both tasks. More precisely,
a combined consideration of electrophysio-
logical and vascular data gave insight to the
complex neurocognitive processes underly-
ing pragmatic language comprehension. Our
results demonstrate the utility of combined
EEG and NIRS measurements to investigate
neural substrates of higher-level cognitive pro-
cesses such as figural language processing
and discourse comprehension.
Are effects of sleep deprivation treatment
in patients with major depression pre-
dictable by event-correlated potentials?
Streuer M, Son K, Juckel G, Norra C Dept.
of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Preventive
Medicine, LWL University Hospital Bochum,
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
As opposed to psychopharmacotherapy the
antidepressive effect of sleep deprivation is
immediate and clinically striking. However,
the search for neurobiological predictors like
aminergic-cholinergic dysbalance of REM
sleep, alterations of circadian rhythms, effects
of vigilance or microsleep has not yet been
successfully terminated. The loudness depen-
dence of auditory evoked potentials (LDAEP)
has been found a potentially valid psychobi-
ological marker for the serotonergic system.
Therefore, the influence of sleep deprivation
treatment on LDAEP in depressive patients
was examined in a controlled study.
In 27 inpatients with a moderate to se-
vere episode of major depression taking
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their individual antidepressive medication a
multichannel-EEG was recorded on two con-
secutive mornings. Auditory evoked potentials
with different intensities (60-100 dB) were
recorded, and LDAEP of N1 and P2 ampli-
tudes was determined. 14 patients took part in
supervised sleep deprivation while 13 patients
served as controls by sleeping as usual. In
addition, mood (BDI, HAM-D) and sleepiness
(SSS) was psychometrically assessed.
Self- and investigator-rated assessments
showed significant improvement of depres-
sive mood in depressive patients after SD
compared to controls. AEP amplitudes and la-
tencies were not different between the groups,
and LDAEP remained intra-individually stable.
Still, there was a clear tendency (p<0.069) of
a stronger LDAEP at baseline in responders
to SD compared to non-responders.
Altogether this pilot study showed effects
of sleep deprivation in AEP analyses of
subgroups with stronger LDAEP, i.e., lower
serotonergic activity, in depressive patients
who were responders to SD. The results are
in line with previous studies showing that a
stronger LDAEP seems to be associated with
a favourable treatment response to seroton-
ergic antidepressants, e.g., SSRI. In order
to find the optimum indication for SD among
depressive patients further studies of LDAEP
in SD are warranted in larger patient samples.
Scalp Topography Evoked by Reading
Color Words W. Skrandies Institute of Physi-
ology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen
Brain imaging studies show that non-
compatible Stroop stimuli activate the an-
terior cingulum of the human brain, and
commonly late ERP effects are described. In
an electrophysiological study we analyzed the
processing of compatible and non-compatible
color words (Stroop condition) and simple
color words (Color condition). Two groups
of 22 healthy adults each participated in two
different experiments. In the Stroop condition
compatible and incompatible color words were
presented on a monitor while in the Color con-
dition simple color words appeared. EEG was
recorded from 30 channels between the inion
and 5In the Stroop condition effects of stimu-
lus compatibility were seen with components
between 120 und 170 ms where compatible
stimuli yielded significantly larger responses.
In the Color condition global field power was
significantly smaller than in the Stroop con-
dition. Components occurring at 170 and at
200 ms showed significant differences in their
scalp topography. There were no topograph-
ical differences at latencies smaller than 130
ms. Our results illustrate that the compatibil-
ity of Stroop stimuli is reflected early in field
strength and topography at about 120 ms la-
tency. In addition, components occurring after
170 ms activated different neurons in Stroop
and Color condition. This suggests specific
top-down processing at the level of the visual
cortex.
Topographical Correlates of Human Se-
mantic Learning W. Skrandies (1) & H.
Shinoda (2) (1) Institute of Physiology, Justus
Liebig University, Giessen, Germany; (2) Fac-
ulty of Psychology, Rissho University, Tokyo,
Japan
We studied human semantic learning of Kanji
symbols in 18 healthy German adults. Forty
Kanji characters were presented visually in
random order before and after a learning ses-
sion of 20 minutes duration. In the learning
period subjects acquired the meaning of 20 of
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the stimuli while the other stimuli served as
unlearned control condition. Learning perfor-
mance was tested at the end of the experi-
ment. Event-related potentials were recorded
from 30 electrodes between the inion and
Fz, and were averaged offline for each con-
dition separately. All subjects learned stimu-
lus meaning with a recall rate of more than
90Our findings show that learning of the se-
mantic meaning of Kanji characters occurs
rapidly within 20 minutes. Learning is directly
related to neurophysiological changes at early
processing stages. Thus learning is reflected
by systematic changes in scalp topography of
electrical brain activity of primary visual areas.
Phase Locking Mechanisms in the Alpha
Range During Retention of a Motor or Vi-
suospatial Working Memory Trace E. Weber
(1), B. Griesmayr (1), & P. Sauseng (2) (1) De-
partment of Physiological Psychology, Univer-
sity of Salzburg, A-5020, Salzburg, Austria
The neuronal correlates of retaining a motor
memory trace are examined in 30 healthy par-
ticipants. Studies using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (Hummel et al, 2002, Sauseng et
al., 2009) showed decreased cortical excitabil-
ity while alpha amplitude was high. Thus, al-
pha activity is assumed to be important for
response inhibition. Concerning interregional
connectivity, Serrien et al. (2005) found in-
creased connectivity between the sensorimo-
tor cortex and prefrontal cortex shortly after
presentation of NoGo stimuli. In the presented
experiment, a finger sequence had to be en-
coded and reproduced after a retention inter-
val of three seconds. In a control condition,
the finger sequence only had to be recognized
(but not reproduced) after the retention inter-
val. In this study, power changes and phase
coupling indices have been investigated in the
alpha range (8-12 Hz) for the reproduction and
recognition conditions as well as for a resting
condition. No significant differences in alpha
power (8-12 Hz) between the retention inter-
vals of recognition or reproduction and a rest-
ing condition have been observed. However,
in contrast to a resting condition, phase de-
coupling of a distributed network in the Alpha
range (8-10 Hz) could be found for both condi-
tions. Further phase coupling analysis showed
significant coupling mechanisms in the upper
Alpha (10-12Hz) in the reproduction condition
between left dorsolateral premotor cortex, right
primary motor cortex and right central and
centroparietal regions in the last second of
the retention period. While Alpha power did
not play a major role retaining a motor mem-
ory trace, phase coupling analysis uncovered
memory-relevant network couplings. This cou-
pling mechanism may be interpreted as a mo-
tor memory trace which is relevant for the re-
call of the respective motor response in par-
ticular shortly before the execution of the ini-
tially inhibited motor response. Supported by
the FWF Project P 22084
Reliability of ERP-data in the STROOP in-
terference task Juliana Wiechert Department
of Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurobi-
ology, Universität Bremen
The STROOP-paradigm is one of the most
consistent experimental approaches in psy-
chological sciences. However, retest-reliability
in individual physiological parameters has not
been examined in both experimental intra- and
inter-session arrangements. Based on previ-
ously published data, an adapted form of the
STROOP-task was applied in an EEG-study
to estimate individual intra- and inter-session
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reliability of behavioural and electrophysiologi-
cal data. Preliminary behavioural data showed
both consistent split-half as well as re-test re-
liability in 15 healthy young female study par-
ticipants. There was an expected interference
effect in the incongruent condition reflected
in longer response times compared to both
congruent and baseline conditions, and a fa-
cilitation effect in the congruent condition re-
flected in shorter response times compared
to the baseline condition. Electrophysiolog-
ical data suggest larger intra- as compared
to inter-session-reliability. Topographical ERP-
effects appeared to be less reliable at process-
ing relevant electrode sites across sessions
as compared to electrode positions not pre-
senting any condition differences. Behavioural
data will critically be discussed in relation to
the respective electrophysiological findings in
an extended sample of individuals.
Model-based strategies for time-variant
analysis of oscillatory EEG/MEG activity H.
Witte, Th. Lehmann, M. Wacker, L. Leistritz
Institute of Medical Statistics, Computer Sci-
ences and Documentation, Jena University
Hospital, Friedrich Schiller University Jena,
D-07740 Jena
It is shown that model-based analysis strate-
gies can be beneficially used for exploring
phase coupling characteristics (linear and
non-linear) and cross-frequency couplings
of and between EEG oscillations. As model
coupled non-linear oscillators (e.g. of the
Duffing type) were applied to identify the
dependencies between time-variant phase-
locking, n:m synchronization, and quadratic
phase coupling patterns as well as their rela-
tions to so-called cross-frequency couplings
(amplitude-amplitude, amplitude-frequency
and frequency-frequency couplings). In a first
step the parameters of the coupled differential
equations (oscillators) are estimated by using
the measured EEG data. In a second step
the differential equations are solved which
results in a corresponding modeled EEG real-
ization. The comparative time-variant analysis
between measured and simulated data re-
veals the effects which can be explained by
the model. Such strategies were successfully
applied for analysis of EEG burst patterns
in sedated patients (encephalographic burst
suppression pattern) and in healthy neonates
(burst-interburst patterns during quiet sleep)
and can be adapted on other oscillatory
EEG/MEG activities.
Neural correlates of switching the atten-
tional focus during finger movements
Kristin Marie Zimmermann (1,2), Matthias
Bischoff (2), Britta Lorey (2,3), Rudolf Stark
(2), Joern Munzert (3) & Karen Zentgraf (1,2)
(1) Institute of Sport Science, Department of
Human Performance and Training in Sport,
University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany;
(2) Bender Institute of Neuroimaging, Justus
Liebig University, Giessen, Germany; (3) In-
stitute of Sport Science, Department of Sport
Psychology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen,
Germany
For more than a decade, sports-related re-
search has been concerned with the effects of
various attentional strategies on motor perfor-
mance. Thereby comparing an attentional fo-
cus on moving body parts (internal focus) with
a focus directed on extracorporeal movement
effects (external focus), the latter seems supe-
rior in producing a benefit in performance out-
come. However, the search for differences in
the underlying mechanisms of an internal and
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an external attentional focus during motor ex-
ecution has just started. This study investi-
gated the effects of switching from a trained to
an unfamiliar attentional focus on BOLD sig-
nal change by applying functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). While performing
an overlearned finger tapping sequence (80
correct sequence executions prior to scanner
session), participants (M = 24.7 years; SD =
2.9; gender matched) were instructed to ei-
ther attend to the keys of the response box
(external focus) or to their fingers (internal fo-
cus). For the last half of all trials during scan-
ner session, an unexpected change in atten-
tional focus (from external to internal and vice
versa) was verbally instructed. The instructed
attentional switch led to increased responses
in the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior
and superior parietal lobule, assumed to de-
pict attentional reallocation. Moreover, chang-
ing from a trained external to a novel inter-
nal focus was associated with higher activation
in the left primary somatosensory cortex and
the right posterior cerebellum. When switch-
ing from a trained internal to an unfamiliar ex-
ternal focus, increased activation was found in
the left premotor cortex, the left secondary so-
matosensory cortex, bilateral anterior and pos-
terior cerebellum, the vermis and the basal
ganglia. We suggest that the motor-related ar-
eas recruited when switching to an external fo-
cus of attention are reflecting a beneficial alter-
ation in motor processing by enhancement of
sensorimotor integration.
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M. Doppelmayr, FB Psychologie, Universität
Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstr. 345020 Salzburg,
Austria
Michael.Doppelmayr@sbg.ac.at
In der zweiten Auflage des Buches Neurobi-
ologie der Psychotherapie verfolgt Prof. Dr.
G. Schiepek von der Paracelsus Medizinis-
chen Universität Salzburg ein ausgesprochen
schwieriges und umfangreiches Unterfan-
gen. In diesem ca. 700 seitigen Sammelw-
erk werden so gut wie alle neurobiologisch
orientierten Aspekte der Psychotherapie
aufgegriffen und zumeist detailliert disku-
tiert. Knapp 100 Autorinnen und Autoren
haben zu diesem Werk beigetragen, unter
Ihnen Persönlichkeiten wie T. Banaschewski,
N. Birbaumer, H. Flor, H. Haken, U. Halsband,
T. Kircher, W. Leeb, H. Markowitsch, W. Milt-
ner, V. Müller, W. Singer oder P. Tass, um nur
einige zu nennen.
Nach einem einleitenden umfassenden
Überblick werden die unterschiedlichen Betra-
chtungsweisen in acht Themenschwerpunkten
aufgearbeitet. Die Themen erstrecken sich hi-
erbei auf die Gebiete Messmethoden; Moleku-
lare Neurobiologie von Gehirn, Immun- und
Endokrinsystem; Das Gehirn als komplexes
System; Psychische Funktionen; Neurobiolo-
gie sozialer Prozesse; Psychische Störungen;
Konsequenzen für Therapien; Wissenschaft-
stheoretische und ethische Fragen. Diese
Übersicht zeigt zugleich den umfassenden
und multidisziplinären Ansatz, der keinen der
in diesem Feld notwendigen oder relevanten
Wissenschaftssektoren ausspart.
Für den Großteil der Leserinnen und Leser
werden vermutlich diejenigen Kapitel, die
einen ganz klaren Bezug zu psychischen
Funktionen, sozialen Prozessen oder psychis-
chen Störungen haben, die Wichtigsten sein.
Dieser Bereich umfasst etwas mehr als die
Hälfte des Buches und schließt eine Vielzahl
an Themengebieten und Störungsbilder ein.
Die einzelnen Kapitel präsentieren sehr
pointiert den aktuellen Stand der Forschung
und sind fast ausnahmslos sehr gut und ver-
ständlich geschrieben und mit entsprechen-
den Tabellen oder Graphiken aufbereitet. Die
hohe Relevanz der neurobiologischen Grund-
lagen und Erklärungsmodelle für den Bereich
der Psychotherapie wird hier klar demonstriert
und abgebildet. In vielen der Kapitel wird auch
ganz spezifisch auf die jeweils ableitbaren
praktischen Konsequenzen der vorgelegten
Befunde hingewiesen. Abhängig vom jew-
eiligen Autor werden naturgemäß die Grund-
lagen und Befunde in sehr unterschiedlicher
Tiefe und aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln
präsentiert. In seiner Gesamtheit ist dieser
Teil aber ausgesprochen gut elaboriert, aktuell
und zumeist hervorragend aufbereitet.
Neben dem eben beschrieben Teil gibt es
noch viele weitere Kapitel, die vornehmlich
Methoden oder reine Grundlagen präsen-
tieren. Wenngleich auch diese gut aufbereitet
sind, aktuelle Verfahren und neue Entwicklun-
gen aufzeigen, so erscheinen mir diese vom
Umfang her etwas unpassend. Für Fachleute
bieten diese kaum Neues und für Personen
die sich nicht konkret damit beschäftigen
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erscheint es zu detailliert. Außerdem ist
etwas unglücklich, wenn z.B.: im Kapitel
zur Elektroenzephalographie spezielle Be-
funde zu Alzheimer Demenz, Depression oder
Schizophrenie besprochen werden, die man
in dieser Form in den spezifischen Kapiteln zu
den Störungen so nicht mehr findet und somit
übersieht, wenn man die Methodenkapitel
nicht durcharbeitet.
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass
dieses Buch eine von erstklassigen Autoren
verfasste, gut gewählte, ausgewogene und
inhaltlich sehr breite Palette an Wissen bi-
etet. Die Kapitel sind Großteils unabhängig
und bauen nicht direkt aufeinander auf, was
es ermöglicht beliebige Bereiche selektiv
durchzuarbeiten. Die Methoden und Grund-
lagen nehmen aus meiner Sicht einen etwas
zu breiten Raum ein, der besser für eine
vertiefte Aufarbeitung klassischer Störungs-
bilder genutzt werden hätte könnte. So sind
etwa dem klassischen Themenbereich ”De-
pression” gerade sieben Seiten gewidmet,
während Bereiche wie ”Systhemtheorie und
Dynamic Causal Modelling” mehr als 30
Seiten umfasst. Generell aber ist dieses
Buch eine hervorragende Arbeit, die sowohl
TherapeutInnen, neurobiologisch orientierten
Fachkräften als auch sehr interessierte Laien
faszinieren wird und mit der G. Schiepek eine
hilfreiche Brücke zwischen Neurobiologie und
Psychotherapie schlägt.
Neurobiologie der Psychotherapie, Günter
Schiepek; 2. Auflage; Schattauer Verlag, Stuttgart
(2011), ISBN 978-3-7945-2674-1, 704 Seiten, 224
Abbildungen, 32 Tabellen, EUR 119.-




The annual meeting of the International Society for Brain Electromagnetic Topography (ISBET) will
take place in Bristol, Tennessee, USA, as a Joint Meeting of ECNS - ISNIP - ISBET - EPIC from
September 12-16, 2012.
Information and Registration at: http://www.ecnsweb.com/2012-conference.htm
• 21. Deutsches EEG/EP Mapping Meeting / 21th German EEG/EP Mapping Meeting
Conference language is German; English contributions will be accepted.
– 12. bis 14. Oktober 2012; Schloss Rauischholzhausen
– Schwerpunkte / Themen
* M. Falkenstein (Dortmund) ”Altern, Kognition und Elektrophysiologie”
* Dr. M. Plichta (Mannheim) Symposium über ”NIRS - Grundlagen und Anwendun-
gen in der Neurophysiologie des Menschen”
– Anmeldeschluss ist der 15. Juli 2012.
– Information und Anmeldung unter: http://www.med.uni-giessen.de/physio/
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